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Abstract
Title: Effects of Graphical In-Flight Weather Information and Graphical Depictions
of Airspace Restrictions on Pilots’ Decisions to Continue VFR Flight into IMC
Author: Andrew James Nakushian
Advisor: Meredith Carroll, Ph.D.
Continued Visual Flight Rules (VFR) flight into Instrument Meteorological
Conditions (IMC) is a leading cause of fatal general aviation accidents. According
to the 2020 Joseph T. Nall Report, this type of accident has a 90% lethality rate.
As a result of this high lethality rate, VFR into IMC is an aviation safety issue
widely discussed among the aviation community in popular media and academic
literature. Additionally, over the past decade, Electronic Flight Bags (EFBs) have
become mainstream in general aviation, replacing paper charts and providing
inflight weather in both graphical and textual form. EFBs also commonly provide
graphical depictions of airspace restrictions along with a moving map. Research
has shown that pilots fly closer to inclement weather and airspace when provided
with a moving map like on a GPS unit. A review of the literature regarding
aeronautical decision making and VFR into IMC found that no studies have
examined the effect of graphical depictions of inflight weather and airspace
restrictions on pilots’ decisions when confronted with a VFR into IMC situation.
The current study was a mixed-methods experimental study that sought to address
that gap in the literature. Ninety-eight participants completed the experimental
task, which consisted of watching an interactive video, selecting a decision
response, and completing a post-scenario questionnaire. The results of the study
indicated that there was no statistically significant impact of either intervention on
time spent in IMC or decision of whether to continue or not. However, there was a
statistically significant interaction between the two interventions for decision
confidence and decision difficulty. Additionally, a thematic analysis indicated that
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most of the participants who entered IMC either assessed the weather as still
suitable for VFR flight or trusted the accuracy of the weather report.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Problem Statement
A small plane is flying straight and level at approximately 4,000 feet AGL.
The 500-hour private pilot is flying with his wife and two kids to visit his in-laws
in Michigan. The pilot does not hold an instrument rating and encounters
deteriorating weather conditions as he approaches the great lakes. He still believes
he can make it and does not want to divert to another airport because that would
result in him and his family delaying their arrival by a day. Shortly after, the pilot
loses visual contact with the ground and becomes spatially disoriented. He declares
an emergency and wants to land at another airport. Sadly, it is too late, and his
aircraft crashes in a field, killing all on board.
The previous situation was fictional; however, it is an amalgamation of
factual pieces taken from narratives in the National Transportation Safety Board
(NTSB) database, and while the narrative written above was made up, the threat
posed by continued Visual Flight Rules (VFR) flight into Instrument
Meteorological Conditions (IMC) is not. According to the 30th Joseph T. Nall
report published by the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association (AOPA), of the 23
weather-related general aviation accidents in 2018, 14 of them were VFR into IMC
accidents (AOPA, 2020). Of those 14 accidents, 13 of them were fatal. This
equates to a 93% lethality rate for VFR into IMC accidents. After poor IFR
procedures, VFR into IMC had the second-highest lethality rate of all of the
accident causes listed in the report. However, it was the most frequent cause of fatal
general aviation accidents. Many of the pilots killed in VFR into IMC accidents
would be alive today if they could identify the degrading weather conditions and
make the correct response to avoid flying into inclement weather. The purpose of
the current study was to examine the effects that both graphical weather
information and graphical depictions of airspace restrictions presented on an
electronic flight bag (EFB) application have on pilots’ decisions to continue VFR
flight into IMC.
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Operational Definitions
For this study, Visual Meteorological Conditions (VMC) was defined as
weather conditions where flight visibility is greater than three statute miles, a
minimum cloud clearance of 500 feet below, 1000 feet above, and 2000 feet
horizontally, and visual reference with the ground can be maintained. VFR flight
was defined as flight by visual reference. IMC was defined as weather conditions
below the defined VMC weather minimums. The EFB was defined as a mobile
device running an application such as Boeing’s Foreflight. Graphical weather
information was defined as weather radar information superimposed onto the EFBs
moving map display. Airspace restriction was defined as a temporary flight
restriction such as one due to a visit from the President of the United States,
depicted graphically on the EFB moving map. The term general aviation refers to
all aviation operations not conducted by the military or air carriers.

Background
The modern general aviation cockpit is filled with advanced technology.
This technology includes but is not limited to panel-mounted GPS navigators,
completely digital flight-information displays, and tablet computers that house
aeronautical charts. All of these technologies provide increased amounts of
information to pilots with the goal of increasing the safety of flight by providing
pilots with a heightened sense of situational awareness. However, there has been
limited research examining the effects of many new technologies that have been
widely adopted over the early-21st century on pilots’ weather-related decisionmaking. Of particular interest is their decisions in the face of VFR flight into IMC
situations. This specific decision is of particular importance because of the high
lethality rate and the short amount of time it takes for pilots to lose control in a
VFR flight into IMC situation. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
explains that the average “lifespan” of a pilot entering IMC during a VFR flight is
178 seconds (FAA, 1993). In just under three minutes, on average, a pilot can go
from a perfectly stable flight to having been involved in a fatal accident. The idea
2

of 178 seconds to live has been a fundamental tenant of the education campaigns
against continuing VFR flight into IMC for close to three decades. As stated
previously, VFR flight into IMC has a 93% lethality rate. This means that 93% of
encounters with IMC during VFR flight will be fatal, and on average, it will take
just under three minutes for the situation to spiral out of control. Despite the
industry and the FAA’s best efforts to educate pilots on the risks posed by
continued VFR flight into IMC, more pilots are killed from it every year.

Rationale/Significance
The impact of inflight graphical information depicting weather and airspace
restrictions on pilots’ decisions to continue flying VFR into IMC is important to
study because VFR into IMC is a leading killer of general aviation pilots.
Additionally, there is limited research examining whether new technologies
influence pilot decisions to continue. Suppose pilots are more likely to continue
into a hazardous situation due to their reliance on modern technology. In that case,
there is a major latent safety issue facing general aviation that needs to be
addressed during flight training. If pilots use the technology to make proactive
decisions and prevent entering the IMC, then modern technology increases safety.
However, until a study explores these factors, the general aviation community will
not know if a major safety issue is present. In-flight weather information is
important to examine because if pilots are informed of inclement weather ahead of
time, they could preemptively take action to avoid the inclement weather.
The effect airspace restrictions have on pilots’ weather-related decisionmaking is important because no prior research has been conducted examining
whether the presence of graphical depictions of airspace restrictions influences how
pilots make decisions regarding the weather. Inadvertently violating airspace
restrictions could result in certificate suspension or revocation, which would result
in the loss of a pilot’s ability to fly. While at first, it may seem unrelated to the
process of weather-related decision making, it is important to remember that
aeronautical decisions are not standalone, and all present circumstances are
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influencing factors to decision making (FAA, 2016a, p.2-1). The question becomes
whether restricted airspace significantly affects the weather-related decisionmaking of pilots as it pertains to continued VFR flight into IMC. Like the question
of inflight graphical weather information, the question of whether airspace
restrictions have an effect on general aviation pilots’ weather-related decisionmaking can only be answered if it is explored empirically.

Generalizability
The current study used participants whom the FAA certificated to fly
single-engine land airplanes with at least a private pilot’s certificate. The results of
the study are generalizable to pilots holding FAA pilot certificates operating singleengine airplanes under Part 91 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (Title 14 CFR).
This is because all general aviation pilots operating in the United States for
recreational purposes operate under Part 91. The results are not generalizable to
charter and air carrier operations under Parts 135 and 121, respectively, because
those operations are primarily IFR in nature, have different operating rules, and are
for compensation or hire.
Pilots must make decisions regarding weather and airspace restrictions
regardless of where they are in the world, and the two types of flight rules VFR and
IFR, exist globally. Therefore, the results of the current study may be generalizable
to some degree to pilots in countries other than the United States. The results are
not fully generalizable because pilots in other countries are trained to different
standards and have to abide by different regulations. It would not be proper to
assume that pilots in Europe or Asia would act the same way as pilots in the United
States.
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Research Questions and Hypotheses
Primary Research Questions
This study had two primary research questions:
1.

What effect does the presence of graphical weather information on the

EFB moving map have on pilots’ decision to continue VFR flight into IMC
as measured by (a) time spent in IMC and (b) pilot decision response?
2.

What effect does the presence of graphical depictions of airspace

restrictions on the EFB moving map have on pilots’ decision to continue
VFR flight into IMC as measured by (a) time spent in IMC and (b) pilot
decision to continue, divert or return to the departure airport?

Exploratory Research Questions
This study had five exploratory research questions:
1. What effect does the presence of graphical depictions of weather
information and airspace restrictions have on decision confidence?
2. What effect does the presence of graphical depictions of weather
information and airspace restrictions have on risk perception?
3. What effect does the presence of graphical depictions of weather
information and airspace restrictions have on risk likelihood?
4. What effect does the presence of graphical depictions of weather
information and airspace restrictions have on decision difficulty?
5. What are the correlational relationships between the following relevant
variables: age, decision confidence, decision difficulty, time in IMC,
weather judgment, EFB experience, flight experience, risk propensity, risk
likelihood, and risk perception?
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Statistical Hypotheses
The associated hypotheses for the two primary research questions
H1A: The presence of EFB graphical weather information will lead to a significant
increase in time spent in IMC.
H1A: The presence of EFB graphical weather information will lead to a significant
increase in pilots whose decision response is to continue VFR into IMC.
H1B: The presence of graphical depictions of airspace restrictions will lead to a
significant decrease in time spent in IMC.
H1B: The presence of graphical depictions of airspace restrictions will lead to a
significant decrease in pilots whose decision response is to continue VFR into IMC.
HA x B: There will be a statistically significant interaction effect between the
presence of EFB weather and the presence of graphical depictions of airspace
restrictions on pilots’ decisions to continue VFR into IMC.

Limitations
Limitations are non-researcher-controlled aspects of the study, which could
limit the scope and generalizability of the study. The first limitation of this study
was that due to it using a convenience sample, there is no guarantee that the sample
will be truly representative of the target population. The second limitation of the
study was that because the participants were not in an actual aircraft, there was no
physical risk to the pilots, and there was a chance that they may have acted
differently responding to a simulated scenario on a computer than in the actual
aircraft due to the lack of risk.

Delimitations
Delimitations are constraints established by the researcher which limit the
scope and generalizability of the study. The first delimitation present in this study
was that only recreational general aviation pilots were used as participants. Due to
the wide array of operations that are categorized as general aviation, the target
population was limited to pilots flying recreationally; this was because pilots flying
6

for recreation are more likely to fly cross-country flights under VFR and have
similar pressures influencing their decisions. Additionally, pilots flying for
recreation would not have pressures placed on them by employers to potentially
break the rules. The second delimitation present in the study was that the target
population was further limited to only include pilots who fly single-engine land
airplanes. This meant that the results might not apply to general aviation pilots
who fly multi-engine land airplanes, gliders, or helicopters. A third delimitation
was that the experimental testbed had a video that the participants interacted with.
They did not have the ability to control the aircraft meaning the participants were
limited to the decision options allowed by the testbed. Those options were
continuing (do nothing), diverting, or returning to the departure airport.

Research Roadmap
This thesis began with a comprehensive review of the literature surrounding
aeronautical decision-making models, weather-related decision-making, airspace
decision-making, VFR flight into IMC, and the use of EFBs. This comprehensive
literature review presents the state of the literature on the various topics relevant to
the proposed study. The review also includes a discussion of the key themes in the
literature and highlights specific gaps. After the existing literature is analyzed, the
experimental design, participants, experimental tasks, experimental procedures, and
data analysis procedures to answer both the primary and exploratory research
questions, results, and discussion are presented. The discussion includes a
theoretical discussion, a practical discussion, a discussion of future research areas,
and recommendations for general aviation industry stakeholders.
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Chapter 2: Review of Related Literature
Introduction
This study examined the effects of decision support systems such as EFBs
and their associated features such as graphical in-flight weather and graphical
airspace restrictions on the decisions made by pilots faced with IMC while
operating under VFR. This topic was chosen because unintentional continued VFR
flight into IMC is a leading cause of weather-related general aviation accidents.
Fourteen of the 23 weather-related accidents in 2018 were VFR into IMC events
(AOPA, 2020). Thirteen of those VFR into IMC events were fatal.
A search through the related literature began by looking at the history and
associated frameworks regarding aeronautical decision-making. My search started
here because understanding the general frameworks behind aeronautical decisionmaking is important in understanding how pilots make decisions, in general. An
understanding of general pilot decision-making makes it easier to understand how
pilots make decisions in specific situations. I then continued to look at aeronautical
decision-making in terms of weather-related decision-making and airspace
decision-making. Weather-related decision-making was examined to see if
previous research has found differences in factors that influence decision-making,
specifically regarding pilots who fly VFR into IMC and those who do not. Next, I
examined the literature concerning airspace-related decision-making for the same
reason. I then shifted my search to look specifically at the literature regarding VFR
flight into IMC. This area of the literature provides an understanding of the
characteristics and behaviors of pilots who have experienced and made decisions
during VFR into IMC events. Understanding these characteristics and behaviors
helps identify which attributes of pilots should be measured when attempting to
explain decision-making in the face of a VFR into IMC event. Finally, I examined
the role that EFBs play in pilot decision-making and performance regarding VFR
into IMC events.
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Aeronautical Decision-Making
The Pilot’s Handbook of Aeronautical Knowledge (PHAK) defines
aeronautical decision-making (ADM) as “the systematic approach to the mental
process used by pilots to consistently determine the best course of action in
response to a given set of circumstances (FAA, 2016a, p.2-1).” In other words,
ADM is the detailed process by which pilots use the information they have in order
to make a decision in a specific circumstance. The FAA stresses the importance of
ADM training in all stages of flight training because learning how to make sound
decisions is essential for pilots as flying requires continuous judgment and
decision-making. Strong ADM is important for risk management and addressing
hazards as they arise. The FAA defines a hazard as anything, whether it is an
object, event, or circumstance, which could result in an undesired event such as an
accident (FAA, 2016b). Common examples of hazards in aviation are fatigue,
illness, weather, and mountainous terrain. Fatigue and illness pose hazards because
they reduce the pilot’s performance, while weather and mountainous terrain can
interrupt the flight path and pose a physical threat to an aircraft.
One of the keys to the ADM process is experience. Jensen (1997) explains
that pilot experience consists of four components: training, flight hours, variety,
and recency. He explains that increases in one or more of these components can
make up for lacking in the others. Training refers to the formal instruction received
by a pilot in order to obtain their initial certificate and advanced ratings. Jensen
explains that during training, discipline and good ADM habits must be conveyed to
the learner. He explains that there is evidence that bad habits conveyed by a pilot’s
first instructor will exist for years. This is why the FAA focuses so much on
ensuring that the principles of ADM and risk management are conveyed to pilots.
According to Jensen, the number of flight hours a pilot has is the strongest
component of experience because the more flight hours a pilot has, the more
experience they will have making decisions in an aviation context. Variety of
experience refers to the different types of flying that a pilot performs. A pilot who
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only flies in the local practice area in one particular type of aircraft will have less
diverse experience than a pilot who flies different types of aircraft on a variety of
missions. The greater number of aircraft and missions will require a pilot to make a
greater array of decisions. The final component of experience is recency. Skills
decay over time, and the more recent a pilot’s experience, the fresher their
judgment skills. All four of these components work together to form the holistic
experience that a pilot can tap into in order to make decisions in the cockpit. Jensen
(1997) goes on to explain that experience combines with risk-management,
attention, dynamic problem solving, and crew resource management in order to
result in ADM.
Similar to the Jensen (1997) framework, Bell and Mauro (2000) consider
experience to be a major component of the ADM process. They explain that as a
pilot’s experience grows, their approach to making decisions evolves. They
explain that experts and novices make decisions differently, and cite Orasanu &
Fischer (1997), who found that expert flight crews when compared to less
experienced flight crews, paid more attention to the situation, used more
information in making decisions, and took action to obtain more information if
necessary. Bell and Mauro (2000) created a three-step framework consisting of the
following components: assessment, decision, and consolidation. Assessment refers
to a pilot’s situational awareness and ability to identify the key facts of a situation.
The decision component refers to taking the information gathering during the
assessment stage and choosing a course of action. Consolidation refers to
evaluating the decision after the fact and learning from it. Bell and Mauro warn
that this phase can be subject to biases and argue that any ADM course should
teach pilots to learn from their decisions and avoid biased reflections.
O’Hare (1992) developed a framework for ADM that centers on risk
assessment. In this model, a pilot starts with the current goal or objective. Then
the pilot assesses the situation and identifies potential risks and associated
mitigation strategies. After that, the pilot then plans their response and chooses
their final decision. The final step is the implementation of the decision. O’Hare
10

explains that in proper ADM, the pilot plans their response and assesses the risk
associated with any possible alternative decisions before making their final
decision. He also explains that if there is more time that pilots should continually
re-evaluate their decisions and alternatives. According to O’Hare, ADM is a
complex and dynamic model for a complex and dynamic environment. He explains
that most decision-making frameworks model one-time decisions, while a proper
ADM model needs to be dynamic. O’Hare’s (1992) model, like the Jensen (1997)
framework, divides the ADM process into clear, actionable steps.
One of the most noticeable aspects of all three ADM frameworks is that
they are dated. All three frameworks were developed over 20-years ago. There
was a noticeable lack of more recent literature modeling ADM. One could infer
from this that the principles from these frameworks have been adopted by the
aviation industry. However, over the past 20-years, aviation has changed
tremendously. Glass panel avionics, space-based navigation, such as global
positioning systems (GPS), and EFBs, which were not pervasive 20 years ago, are
now commonplace in aviation. These new technologies could quite possibly
influence the way decisions are made in the cockpit. This could mean that the
ADM models discussed could potentially be outdated.
In 1991, the FAA published an advisory circular titled “Aeronautical
Decision-making.” The purpose of this document was to provide educational
information regarding ADM to pilots and flight instructors. The FAA explained
that it was the result of internal research conducted by the agency. This document
resulted in two new concepts that are used in ADM training and guidance to this
day. The first concept was the concept of hazardous attitudes, and the second
concept was the operational pitfalls.
The hazardous attitudes are five behavioral predispositions that are
considered hazardous to safe flight. The five hazardous attitudes are anti-authority,
impulsivity, invulnerability, macho, and resignation (FAA, 1991). A pilot with an
anti-authority does not like following the rules and may break them or skip
procedures. An impulsive pilot will act without thinking first; they do not always
11

think through the alternative courses of action prior to making a decision. An
invulnerable pilot may think that accidents will not happen to them. A macho pilot
may think that they are better than other pilots or are capable of things outside of
their capabilities. Finally, a pilot experiencing resignation may give up when
something happens because they feel like it is outside of their control. The FAA
provides what they have called “antidotes” to hazardous attitudes. These antidotes
are statements that allow pilots to remind themselves that these attitudes are
hazardous and help them be aware that they have these tendencies. In the 1991
advisory circular, the FAA provides a hazardous attitudes inventory for pilots to
identify which hazardous attitudes they hold.
The hazardous attitudes were a major change to the understanding of ADM.
By using single words, it conveys the idea that there are thought patterns that pilots
could exhibit, which puts pilots at an increased risk of being involved in an
accident. Due to its simplified nature, the hazardous attitudes model helps make
pilots without a background in psychology understand the concepts that are trying
to be conveyed. If pilots are cognizant of their risk attitudes, they can be more
aware, which could improve their ADM skills.
The ADM Advisory Circular also introduced the concept of the operational
pitfalls. The operational pitfalls are a series of 12 behavioral traps that many pilots
either fall into or are tempted by. The FAA explains that these pitfalls are
especially hazardous to pilots with large amounts of experience. This is because as
pilots gain experience, the desire to complete the flight as planned increases and
pilots may try something that is not safe or legal in order to avoid a diversion. The
relevant operational pitfalls for a VFR flight would be peer pressure, mindset, getthere-itis, scud running, continuing VFR flight into IMC, getting behind the
aircraft, losing situation awareness, operating without adequate fuel reserves, and
improper flight planning (FAA, 1991). Many of these operational pitfalls are selfexplanatory as to their risk. Mindset refers to the pilot’s inability to cope with
changing situations. Mindset is related to Get-there-itis, which refers to the desire
of the pilot to stick to the original plan or destination and clouds judgment of a
12

changing situation. Scud running refers to flying at a low altitude to avoid a low
ceiling. Getting behind the aircraft is when a pilot allows the aircraft to control
their actions, and the pilot is no longer mentally “in control” of the aircraft. Losing
situational awareness refers to not being aware of one’s surroundings; this includes
failing to recognize deteriorating conditions. If a pilot is preparing for a longawaited vacation, for example, they might be more at risk to attempt to complete
the flight as planned and fall into one of these operational pitfalls instead of doing
the safe thing and delaying departure or diverting.
Every pilot has their own level of risk perception and comfort when it
comes to different aspects of the flight. Drinkwater and Molesworth (2010) were
interested in looking at pilots’ risk management behavior. They took 56 flight
students from a university in Australia. They wanted to find the relationship
between aviation attitudes, risk perception, demographics, and risky flight
behavior. The pilots were flying an aircraft in a PC simulator. The researchers had
the pilots doing touch-and-goes and were told that they were low on fuel as the
aircraft had just returned from a cross-country flight. On their last landing, the
airport operator went on the radio and requested the pilot go look for a parachuter
who had drifted. The participants were all told that it was not an emergency
situation and to do it only if it would comply with normal procedures, including
fuel reserve requirements. They were told if they went to find the skydiver, they
had to circle it once and then fly back.
The results of the Drinkwater and Molesworth (2010) study were that 20
pilots decided to continue and land the aircraft as planned, and 36 pilots decided to
look for the skydiver despite knowing about low fuel. There was a statistically
significant (p < .05) difference in risk perception scores between the group that
elected to land and the group that elected to continue. There were no significant
differences in attitude between the two groups. Additionally, there were no
significant differences based on demographics. These results suggest that the pilots
who decided to go had a different risk perception than the pilots who did not.
These results are useful in a discussion of ADM because if a pilot perceives risk
13

differently, that could result in different decisions. Understanding a pilot’s risk
perception associated with a given situation is important in the understanding of
their decision. A limitation of the Drinkwater and Molesworth (2010) study is that
it used university flight students. This resulted in an average age that is younger
than the average age of general aviation pilots. This means that if age was a factor
in risk perception, it might not be found. Additionally, the scenario was occurring
in a PC flight simulator, which meant that there was no actual personal risk. This
could have influenced the participants’ decisions to continue the flight despite
being told to treat it as an actual flight. Risk perceptions could impact pilots’
decisions to continue flying VFR into IMC because if a pilot perceives the flight as
low risk, they may be more likely to try to attempt it, setting the stage for an
accident.

Weather-Related Decision-Making
An important area of ADM is weather-related decision-making. According
to the 2020 Joseph T. Nall report published by AOPA, weather-related accidents
had the highest percentage of fatal accidents of any of the types of pilot-related
accidents for non-commercial-fixed-wing aircraft (AOPA, 2020). The types of
accidents they measured were takeoff, landing, approach/descent, fuel
mismanagement, maneuvering, weather, and other causes. Ninety-one percent of
weather-related accidents were fatal in 2018. While the weather was not the most
common cause, it was by far the most lethal. The high lethality of weather-related
accidents demonstrates a need to understand the decision-making processes of
pilots as they make weather-related decisions. My search through the literature
found research that looked at the mental models behind weather-related decisionmaking, the role experience has in weather-related decision making, the extent to
which pilots adhere to their personal minimums, and the effects of cognitive biases
on weather-related decisions.
A study by Hunter et al. (2003) sought to understand how pilots make
weather-related decisions. They took a sample of 3,000 pilots from the United
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States, 500 pilots from Norway, 400 pilots from Australia and mailed them
questionnaire booklets. In the end, 326 pilots from the United States, 104 pilots
from Norway, and 51 pilots from Australia completed the questionnaire. The
participants were instructed to read the 27 scenarios, rank them, and then rate their
comfort level with the scenarios. The 27 scenarios all consisted of different
combinations of ceiling, visibility, and precipitation. The researchers then took the
mean comfort levels and compared them. They found that, on average, pilots were
more comfortable flying over land first, water second, and mountainous terrain
third. They also found high correlations between the average comfort scores
between the three countries. The correlation between the scores of the United
States and Norway was r=0.98, between the United States and Australia was
r=0.91, and Norway and Australia were r=0.89.
The results of the Hunter et al. (2003) study show that despite the
geographical differences between the three countries, the pilots all expressed
similar levels of comfort towards the scenarios. Hunter et al. (2003) then created
regression equations and found that most of the variance was explained by the
product of the three manipulated components of ceiling, precipitation, and
visibility. The major benefit of this research is that it illustrates that despite
differences in geographic locations and certification requirements between nations,
the results of research looking into weather-related decision-making have
generalizability to other countries in the world regardless of where the research was
conducted. It appears to be highly generalizable since the decision-making model
correlates highly between countries. This finding suggests that the results of the
proposed study could be generalizable to pilots outside of the United States.
However, due to differences in training and certification among pilots in other
countries, caution should be taken in generalizing results to other countries. The
primary limitation of the Hunter et al. (2003) study was that the sample sizes were
not equal. This means that some of the other countries were underrepresented in
the study. Another limitation of the study was that the questionnaires were not
identical between countries. For example, Australia does not experience snow, so
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the questions regarding snow were replaced with dust. This opened the potential
for an instrumentation threat to internal validity because the instruments were not
necessarily equivalent. Overall, the findings of the Hunter et al. (2003) study were
informative and relevant to the study of weather-related decision-making, as they
show that factors beyond just the weather conditions influence pilots’ comfort and
weather-related decision making.
A study by Wiggins and O’Hare (1995) took a cross-sectional look at
general aviation pilots to assess the effects of experience on pilots’ weather-related
decision-making. The study consisted of 40 pilots from New Zealand who were
divided into groups based on their amount of cross-country flight experience. The
pilots completed a series of decision-making scenarios. Each scenario contained
the information a pilot would have access to in an actual flight. Each information
source was included in a separate menu, and the amount of time each participant
spent on each menu was tracked. The study found that there were both quantitative
and qualitative differences in how pilots responded to the weather-related decisionmaking scenarios. The inexperienced pilots were more likely to return to their
departure airport, while the intermediate and advanced pilots were more likely to
continue to their destination airport. Additionally, inexperienced pilots were more
likely to rate their confidence in their decision-making as low confidence, while
experienced pilots were more likely to be highly confident in their decisionmaking. The study also found that the less experienced pilots were more likely to
vocalize their information intake and their decision-making process.
The Wiggins and O’Hare (1995) study is useful in a discussion of weatherrelated ADM because it shows that a pilot’s experience influences the type and
confidence of their decision. It shows that pilots who were more experienced are
more likely to press on into inclement weather and be confident in that decision
when actually that confidence may be misplaced. This could be a potential risk
facing the aviation industry where experienced pilots may be overconfident in their
decision-making. Wiggins and O’Hare (1995) cite McKinney (1993) to
demonstrate that there is evidence that more experienced pilots tend to make
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incorrect decisions in sudden emergencies when compared to less-experienced
pilots. A potential limitation of the Wiggins and O’Hare (1995) study is that it only
used pilots from one country. Cultural differences between countries could
possibly influence decision-making in other parts of the world. Additionally, the
scenarios were computerized and were not realistic to the flight task. Pilots may
respond differently to a hypothetical situation with no risk than they would in the
actual aircraft.
There are several types of weather-related decisions that pilots face, such as
decisions regarding their adherence to their personal weather minimums. Personal
weather minimums are the minimum weather conditions that a given pilot chooses
to fly into, given their level of skill and experience. These personal minimums can
be more conservative than the minimums set in the Federal Aviation Regulations.
However, they cannot be lower than the federally set minimums. Winter et al.
(2020) conducted a study where 114 participants with a minimum of a private pilot
certificate and an instrument rating flew an instrument approach in a flight training
device. In the simulated scenario, the clouds went all the way down to the surface.
These conditions would prohibit the completion of the approach, and the proper
procedure would dictate that the pilots execute a missed approach procedure. The
participants were instructed to fly the approach as they would in an actual airplane.
After the approach was either completed or terminated, the participants were
administered a follow-up questionnaire. The results of the study showed that
96.4% of the participants descended below their personal minimums, and 84.1% of
participants descended below the FAA-established minimums for the approach.
Six of the participants (approx. 5%) continued down to a landing. This was even
though the weather conditions were below legal IFR minimums. These results are
important because they show that despite many pilots claiming that they set
personal minimums, many violate them up to and including violating the FAA
minimums on the approach. It also shows that many pilots may disregard their set
minimums to complete the flight as planned. Two potential limitations Winter et
al. (2020) identified were that they only used participants from one university flight
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training program and that the study was conducted in a flight training device.
Using participants from one university could limit the generalizability of the study
to all general aviation pilots. However, that limitation is mitigated by the fact that
the weather minimums are standardized across the United States. Where a pilot
completed their training should not have an impact on the prescribed minimums for
an instrument approach. The fact that the study was conducted using a flight
training device removes the real-world risk from the situation. This could
potentially result in pilots acting differently in the simulator than they would in the
actual aircraft.
A theory that can help explain why pilots make risky decisions is prospect
theory. Prospect theory is the idea that people treat potential gains differently than
potential losses (Walmsley and Gilbey, 2020). Walmsley and Gilbey (2020)
explain that prospect theory is traditionally used in the context of financial gains or
losses. However, they argue that prospect theory could also be used for time gain
and losses. They conducted a study where participants from a flight school in New
Zealand were given a series of scenarios where each scenario had two alternative
routes. Two of the scenarios involved monetary gains and losses, and the third
involved time gains and losses.
Walmsley and Gilbey (2020) found that pilots view time decision-making
to be different from monetary decision-making. The results indicate that a majority
of pilots tend to be risk-averse when it comes down to a time delay. This could be
explained because aircraft carry limited amounts of fuel, and an uncertain time
delay could increase the likelihood of a fuel emergency. They also found that
pilots chose the riskier scenario when the cause of the delay was ATC-related while
taking the more risk-averse option when the delay was weather-related. The results
of the Walmsley and Gilbey (2020) study are important for a discussion of ADM
because they show that pilots make decisions in the face of time delays differently
than they would a monetary gain/loss. They also show that pilots make different
decisions in the face of adverse weather than they would if the delay were caused
by a non-weather factor. In other words, pilots are more risk-averse in the face of
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an uncertain time delay due to weather than if the same delay were due to ATC
issues. Walmsley and Gilbey (2020) identified four potential limitations to their
study. The first was that the study used low-time pilots. Low-time pilots are pilots
who are relatively inexperienced. In many aviation contexts, low-time pilots are
pilots with less than 1,500 hours which is the minimum required for an airline
transport pilot rating (ATP). They explain that research shows that experience
changes risk perception and that more experienced pilots could make different
decisions. The second was that the study used written scenarios, and the response
to such scenarios does not always translate into how an individual would respond in
the real world. The third limitation is that they should have included a negative
utility scenario for reference. Walmsley and Gilbey’s results are relevant to the
proposed study because they found that pilots are more likely to take a risk for an
uncertain monetary gain. Perhaps a pilot faces a monetary loss if the flight is not
completed on time, resulting in pressure to continue the flight even when it is not
safe to do so.

Weather-Related Decision Support Tools
In general terms, a decision support tool is anything used to help a pilot
make better and more-informed decisions. Some examples of these include preflight risk assessment tools, EFBs, and synthetic vision systems included in aircraft
avionics suites. Each of these tools can play a role in the decision-making
processes of pilots regarding weather.
Parmar and Thomas (2020) looked at the effects of a probabilistic risk
situational awareness tool on aeronautical weather decision-making. A
probabilistic risk assessment tool is a tool that provides a probability of a certain
risky event occurring during a given time period. Parmar and Thomas (2020)
explain that while many events have a low probability of occurrence during a given
operation, the lifetime probability of occurrence is much higher. They use a car
accident as an example; for any given drive, the probability of being in an accident
is approximately 1:10,000; however, over one’s lifetime, the probability is 1:3
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(Parmar and Thomas, 2020). They explain that one way to aid pilots in making
decisions is to provide a probability that a certain risk would occur during that
flight. In their study, they created a tool that used weather radar imagery and gave
the probability that the route of flight would come within 20 nautical miles (nmi) of
hazardous weather. The 20 nmi distance is the FAA’s recommended distance from
convective weather. The study involved 343 undergraduate students who were
exposed to varying levels of decision support. The first level was simply the radar
with no probability. The remaining three levels had increasing levels of accuracy
of the probability estimate. The participants were presented with a flight path and
the corresponding risk of that flight path unless it was in the no probability group.
The participants then had to choose whether the route was in compliance with the
20 nmi rule. The study found that as the accuracy of the probability estimates
increased, the participants were more likely to correctly determine if the route was
away from the weather. They also found that there was a significant amount of
learning transfer from the training phase, which the authors explain meant that the
operators were understanding and using the tool as designed. A limitation of the
Parmar and Thomas (2020) study is that they did not use pilots. Although this was
fine for a study looking at the feasibility, there is no way of knowing if the tool
improves pilot decision-making as pilots are taught to make weather decisions
without such tools. They explain that this is an area of future research.
Additionally, it does not take into account the variety of other weather products
pilots use together to make their decisions. This is relevant to the proposed study
because EFB weather displays do not give the probability of encountering
inclement weather. Pilots have to look at textual and graphical weather and make a
decision about whether to fly or not. Not having added decision support means
pilots have to estimate weather conditions by looking out the window.
Another type of decision support tool is a rule-of-thumb. Pilots can use
rules-of-thumb to estimate distances and times in flight quickly. Ahlstrom et al.
(2019) looked at these rules-of-thumb to see if they would increase the accuracy of
pilot out-the-window estimates of in-flight visibility. The study consisted of 66
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pilots who were divided into three groups one was a control group, one used a map
distance method, and the third used the slant range rule-of-thumb. The slant range
rule-of-thumb involves taking a pencil and putting it on the horizon. Each pencil
width the horizon is above the apex of the hood is 3 nmi of visibility. The map
distance method is a method of estimating visibility by looking at waypoints on the
map and estimating flight visibility by locating them out the window. The study
was conducted in a flight simulator. Ahlstrom et al. (2019) found that, on average,
the errors in visibility estimates were half as large by the group who used the slant
range method than the other two methods. They also found that participants
underestimated better visibilities, which meant that they were making conservative
estimates. However, they also found that some participants were overestimating
worse weather. The Ahlstrom et al. (2019) study is useful because the results
support the notion of using quick and easy rules-of-thumb to help aid in the making
of weather decisions. This is useful because many pilots fly without advanced
technology, and having a quick and easy rule-of-thumb to help improve the
estimation of visibility could help those pilots who fly without in-flight weather
information and are suspecting that the conditions may be deteriorating. They
could, then, based on the estimate created by using the rule-of-thumb, make the
further decision of whether to continue, divert, or return to the departure airport.
One limitation of the Ahlstrom et al. (2019) study is that since it was in a simulator,
the weather changes can be more salient than they are in the actual environment.
Additionally, the slant range rule-of-thumb only works if the aircraft is level.
One of the more common forms of decision support tools in the general
aviation cockpit is the portable weather application. Many pilots get their weather
through EFB applications such as ForeFlight and Garmin Pilot. Ahlstrom et al.
(2016) looked at the effect that portable weather applications have on decisionmaking in a general aviation environment. The study consisted of 70 participants,
of which only 8 had experience with portable weather applications. The
participants were flying in a simulated general aviation cockpit. Half of the
participants had a portable weather application with a variety of aviation weather
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products on it, while the other half did not. The researchers measured weathersituational awareness, distance from weather, weather avoidance, decision-making,
display interaction, and cognitive engagement. They found that the experimental
group had more deviations from the planned course in an attempt to avoid
inclement weather. However, they found similar altitude deviations between both
the experimental and the control groups. They found that the pilots in the
experimental group were more likely to divert to an alternate as well as more likely
to remain further away from the inclement weather. The results of Ahlstrom et al.
(2016) indicate that the use of portable inflight weather applications aids pilots in
taking actions to avoid hazardous weather. In the context of the current study,
having the inflight weather in graphical form over a moving map display gives a
presentation similar to that of a GPS navigator. As such, I predict that it will be
used in a similar manner as GPS (i.e., as opposed to how the weather application
was used in Ahlstrom’s study), and there is evidence that pilots use GPS to justify
continuing into inclement weather. These findings also suggest that pilots using
inflight weather are more aware of the weather around them. Pilots have the
technology now to make better-informed decisions in the cockpit. However,
Ahlstrom et al. (2016) also warn that just because pilots have access to technology
to aid in their decision-making does not mean that they will make the proper
decisions. They explain that many of the pilots still flew closer than what was
recommended to the hazardous weather. They explain that better training in
weather-related decision-making is also necessary to have pilots make the best
decisions out of the increased situational awareness. A potential limitation of this
research is that it was conducted in the simulator, and simulator studies remove the
risk from the situation, and as a result, pilots may behave differently than in the real
world. A second limitation is that since the study was conducted by the FAA,
participants may behave differently than they would in an actual aircraft since a
regulatory agency is conducting the study.
Synthetic vision is another example of a decision support tool. Synthetic
vision systems are displays that provide a digital three-dimensional representation
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of the terrain ahead of the aircraft (Johnson et al., 2006). Johnson et al. (2006)
explain that having a digital representation of the terrain could prove to be helpful
in avoiding spatial disorientation during unintended VFR flight into IMC.
However, that same benefit poses some major risks. Pilots could potentially spend
too much time looking at their advanced flight displays and miss visual cues of
degrading weather outside the cockpit. Additionally, pilots could use the
technology to continue flying into weather that they should not be flying in due to
the perceived increase in situational awareness provided by avionics.
Johnson et al. (2006) conducted a study with 30 pilots flying simulated VFR
flights into simulated deteriorating conditions. The participants were divided into
three groups. The first group consisted of 10 pilots who had normal flight
instruments, the second group had ten pilots with synthetic vision, and the third
group consisted of 10 pilots with synthetic vision and a moving weather map. The
study found that pilots using synthetic vision were six times more likely to continue
into the IMC than the pilots in the control group. They also found that the pilots
flying an aircraft with traditional instruments looked outside four times as much as
the pilots in the synthetic vision groups (Johnson et al., 2006). However, the study
also found that of the non-instrument-rated pilots who continued in IMC, all of
them were able to navigate to the airport successfully.
The results of the Johnson et al. (2006) study demonstrate that synthetic
vision systems have the potential to save lives by allowing pilots who enter IMC
inadvertently to maintain situational awareness. However, they also put pilots at
risk to continue flying in conditions that are not safe and, in the case of noninstrument-rated pilots, also illegal. In the current study, the EFB is also a tool that
enhances situational awareness, which should help decision-making, but it could
also promote pilots trying to push their limits due to increased information. One
potential limitation of the study was that the study used primarily low-time pilots.
Low-time pilots could possibly respond differently than high-time pilots due to a
lack of experience. Having a larger and more diverse sample could answer this
question. Another limitation is that being in a simulator, the participants could
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conceivably behave differently than in the actual aircraft. The current study has a
similar situation in which there is no actual risk to the participants due to the
scenario being simulated; this could result in the participants behaving differently
than they would in actual flight.
Another common technology installed in many general aviation cockpits is
GPS. GPS allows for point-to-point navigation in a way previous electronic
navigation systems could not (Wiggins, 2007). Over time, these GPS systems have
accumulated more features, including moving map displays, information databases,
and communications features. One of the concerns regarding GPS is that pilots
may rely too much on it and use it as a crutch in poor weather conditions. Wiggins
(2007) conducted a study to look at whether GPS use impacts decision-making.
The sample consisted of 177 non-instrument-rated pilots from Australia. They
were each administered a survey with a variety of Likert Scale items looking at the
use of GPS and the importance of weather cues. The results of the study show that
pilots who rated horizontal visibility as the most important weather cue were less
likely to utilize GPS as their primary source of navigation. They also indicated that
pilots who considered cloud cover to be their most important cue were more likely
to use GPS. Increasing cloud cover could indicate a deterioration of conditions
from VMC to IMC. Wiggins (2007) explains that these correlations could suggest
that pilots who use GPS as a primary source of navigation information are more
likely to fly in weather to inadvertent IMC. It is also important to note that these
relationships are correlational, and as such, causation cannot be inferred from
Wiggins’ (2007) study. However, despite this limitation, it opens up the question
for further research about whether using GPS systems results in pilots operating in
more marginal weather that could put them at risk of a VFR into IMC situation. In
the proposed study, the EFB will have a moving map display similar to the GPS
display; this could result in pilots relying on the EFB to fly into marginal
conditions in a similar manner to how Wiggins suggests pilots utilize GPS.
Many of the previously mentioned decision support systems aid in decisionmaking by providing information that can assist in the development of situational
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awareness, in addition to the visual cues observed outside the cockpit windows.
For example, (a) rules-of-thumb such as the slant range rule allows for estimates of
how far one is from weather conditions; (b) inflight weather applications present
similar information to what is available in a weather briefing in visual form for
inflight access, and (c) synthetic vision and GPS are both installed systems that
provide more situational awareness about an aircraft location in space. However,
for all of these to help pilot decision-making, pilots need to understand the threats
weather poses. Blickensderfer et al. (2017) looked at the extent of pilots’ weather
knowledge via a written test. They did this because there was a lack of literature
regarding pilots’ knowledge of weather despite the statistics that weather-related
accidents remained stubbornly high. Blickensderfer et al. (2017) worked with a
team of meteorologists, flight instructors, and human factors specialists to develop
questions based on the weather knowledge needed for all flight phases. All
questions were multiple choice with three to four answer options. Once it was
developed, the questionnaire was reviewed by a separate panel of experts to ensure
content validity. Two hundred-four participants took the questionnaire. The results
indicated that the average score was 57.9% on a scale of 0-100%. Among student
pilots, the average score was 47.7%; among private pilots, the average score was
56.7; for private pilots with instrument ratings, the average score was 61.8%, and
for commercial pilots, the average score was 65.6%. All of these numbers are low,
given that proper understanding of weather information is critical for sound ADM.
Blickensderfer et al. (2017) explain that further research is needed to look at why
pilots have low weather knowledge scores. A limitation of this study was that it
only looked at weather products such as METARS, TAFs, weather charts, etc. It
did not look at pilots’ understanding of theory. Pilots could have an understanding
of weather theory but could be struggling with the interpretation of weather
products. That being said, the weather products are what pilots are using to base
their decisions, so if there is a lack of understanding of weather products, which is
important to know such training changes can be made to resolve that. The results of
this study are important in a discussion of ADM because understanding weather
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information is vital to making weather decisions, and research shows that pilots
lack an understanding of weather information which could be a factor in pilots
deciding to fly VFR into IMC.

Airspace Decision-Making
While pilots are flying, they also must avoid entering the airspace they are
not authorized to enter. On a VFR flight, a pilot needs a clearance to enter Class B
airspace, to be in two-way communication for Class C and D airspace, and
permission from the controlling agency to enter a restricted area. This means pilots
must make decisions both before and during the flight in order to avoid entering the
airspace they are not supposed to enter. A search of the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration (NASA) Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) found 82
instances of airspace violations due to the use of EFBs (NASA, 2021).
A study by Psyllou and Majumdar (2019) looked at how general aviation
pilots choose their routes in complex airspace. They explain that in Europe, one of
the most common safety issues is pilots entering airspace they are not authorized to
enter. They wanted to see how pilots make decisions regarding choosing their
routes to avoid complex or restricted airspace. Psyllou and Majumdar explain that
there has been little research into how pilots make decisions regarding airspace.
There were 27 participants in the Psyllou and Majumdar (2019) study. The
participants were general aviation pilots from Norway, Finland, and the United
Kingdom. The participants were asked ten questions regarding how they plan
flights, whether they have been involved in an airspace violation, and what
resources they use to plan a flight. The Psyllou and Majumdar study found that
70% of participants planned routes near or under controlled or restricted airspace.
The results also showed that the pilots tended to plan flights near controlled
airspace in order to get clearance to enter but then flew beneath it when denied
entry-clearance. The exception to this were gliders and European-ultralight (similar
to Light-Sport Aircraft in the United States), which were not always equipped for
flying in controlled airspace. Other reasons pilots flew close to or beneath
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controlled or restricted airspace were lack of uncontrolled airspace. The proximity
of controlled airspace to departure or destination airport was also a factor.
The Psyllou and Majumdar (2019) study used qualitative analysis to explore
the factors that contributed to pilots flying near controlled airspace. Psyllou and
Majumdar found that the closer pilots fly to controlled or restricted airspace, the
more likely an accidental incursion is to occur. The most common reason is wind
pushing an aircraft off course and penetrating the airspace boundary.
Understanding what factors contribute to pilots choosing their routes is crucial to
understanding their decision-making along the routes. For example, if a route is
boxed in by restricted airspace or airspace an aircraft is unable to enter, a pilot
could choose to continue to fly through the weather. One limitation of the Psyllou
and Majumdar (2019) study is that it consisted only of interviews and did not test
decision-making in a simulator. What the pilots said they do and what they actually
do could be different. Additionally, it is important to note that the airspace
structure, rules, and pilot certification structure in Europe is different from the
United States. That means that the results do not transfer 100%. For example, in
the United States, Class E airspace is controlled airspace, but one does not need to
be in contact with ATC. It might make more sense to think of controlled airspace
mentioned in the article as Class B airspace where an entry clearance is needed.
These findings are relevant to the current study because pilots may behave more
conservatively if their route takes them close to restricted airspace in order to
prevent inadvertently violating the airspace. An inadvertent violation could result in
suspension or revocation of a pilot’s certificate.
Another study by Psyllou and Manjumdar (2018) looked at the types of
navigation used by general aviation pilots and the effects they have on decisionmaking. The study interviewed 27 pilots and asked them about the types of
navigation they used. The study looked at the three types of navigation used by
most pilots. The first was visual, and that is looking out the window and following
landmarks; this includes both pilotage and dead-reckoning, the second was
electronic, and that is using Very High-Frequency Omni-Directional Range (VOR),
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and the third is space-based, which uses GPS. Of particular interest to the
researchers was GPS since that could potentially alter the way pilots plan their
routes since it automatically calculates a heading to fly. They found that pilots who
primarily used visual navigation chose salient landmarks such as lakes, rivers,
distinctive buildings. They avoided things like towns that could be easily confused.
They choose their landmarks ahead of time. The participants who flew via visual
navigation explained that it was easier to plan a route in an area they were familiar
with. The participants who flew via electronic navigation explained that they
planned their route in advance based on the location of the VORs they were using
for navigation. The users of space-based navigation said it allowed them to be
more aware of restricted and controlled aircraft. Glider pilots especially made use
of it as it allowed them to quickly orient themselves as they circled up to altitude.
However, participants also expressed that GPS made it easier to lose situational
awareness at times. Psyllou and Manjumdar (2018) found that overall general
aviation pilots used a combination of methods such as visual and GPS in order to
navigate. They explain that this provides redundancy as well as more situational
awareness. They also explain that each method has limitations, and using a
combination of methods would best compensate for them. For example, in visual
navigation, the only way a pilot can determine they are off course is when they
reach the next visual checkpoint. Following a GPS track would inform them of
necessary course corrections at an earlier time. The results of this study are
relevant to the current study because the pilots who utilized GPS felt more aware of
restricted airspace but reported that it was easier to lose situational awareness. If a
pilot loses situational awareness, they could potentially not recognize degrading
weather conditions.
A study conducted by Zuschlag (2005) analyzed NASA ASRS reports for
unintentional violations of the Washington, DC Air Defense Identification Zone
(ADIZ). The ADIZ was a region of heightened security and enhanced operational
requirements created around the National Capital Region as a response to the
terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. It is important to note that since the article
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was published, the ADIZ was replaced with the DC Special Flight Rules Area
(SFRA) (14 CFR § 93.339). Zuschlag’s (2005) analysis of ASRS reports found
that during a two-year period, nearly half of the 2,900 airspace violations occurred
near the DC ADIZ. The analysis also found that most restricted airspace violations
occurred in places where restrictions were predictable, not in places where
temporary flight restrictions (TFRs) had “popped up” suddenly. Zuschlag (2005)
then conducted a qualitative analysis of the narratives associated with the ASRS
reports in order to identify factors that contributed to pilots violating the restricted
airspace. The results of the analysis found that most of the violating pilots were
aware of the existence of the restricted airspace but were not aware of the
dimensions of the restrictions. Zuschlag explained that this could point to an issue
with the presentation and communication of notices to airmen (NOTAM)
information regarding the flight restrictions. If briefers gave pilots a more detailed
description of the airspace dimensions, pilots would most likely be better at
avoiding it. One thing to note when reading the results of Zuschlag’s (2005)
analysis is the age of the study. The analysis is from a time prior to the depiction of
the boundaries of the ADIZ and later SFRA onto aeronautical charts. Currently,
the boundaries of the DC SFRA are printed on the Washington Sectional Chart, and
pilots are required to take an online course that trains them procedures of operating
within the DC SFRA to avoid violations. The FAA has incorporated these
recommendations into the procedures for operating in the DC area. However, the
results of the Zuschlag (2005) study are still useful in discussing decision-making
around restricted airspace because many airspace restrictions are not depicted on
the aeronautical chart, and many NOTAM descriptions are not very clear. While
the FAA may have taken steps to avoid airspace incursions around DC, pilots could
continue to inadvertently violate airspace restrictions due to poor communication of
the location and dimensions of airspace restrictions. The results of the Zuschlag
(2005) study could drive future research looking into the communication of
airspace restrictions and whether the current DC SFRA procedures reduce airspace
incursions. Zuschlag’s findings are relevant to the current study because the
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scenarios are taking place around the Washington, DC area, and the associated
airspace restrictions will be depicted graphically, which may encourage pilots to
stay a safe distance from the airspace, impacting the decisions they make regarding
the weather.

VFR Flight into IMC
Continued VFR flight into IMC is one of the most lethal contributing
factors to general aviation accidents (AOPA, 2020). It is such a serious concern
that the NTSB issued a safety alert about it in 2013. The NTSB (2013) wrote that
“Historically, about two-thirds of all general aviation (GA) accidents that occur in
reduced-visibility weather conditions are fatal (p.1).” The safety alert document
explained that reduced-visibility situations are dangerous because they can lead to
spatial disorientation. The NTSB uses the term reduced-visibility weather
conditions so they can include VFR into IMC as well as other conditions that can
also lead to spatial disorientation. While the NTSB cites that two-thirds of reduced
visibility accidents are fatal, an analysis of general aviation accident data from
2018 by AOPA found a 93% lethality rate of VFR into IMC incidents (AOPA,
2020).

Attributes of Pilots who Fly VFR into IMC
Due to the high lethality of VFR into IMC accidents, it is important to
understand the characteristics of the pilots who get involved in these situations.
Understanding which type of pilots are involved in these situations could lead to
targeted training and awareness campaigns in order to reduce the frequency and
lethality of VFR into IMC accidents. A study by Gallo et al. (2015) looked at the
experiences of the small percentage of pilots who have experienced a VFR in an
IMC situation and survived it. Gallo et al. (2015) conducted a qualitative analysis
of interviews with 11 pilots and identified common attributes of pilots who have
encountered VFR into IMC situations. The Gallo et al. (2015) study found that
most of the participants checked the weather and received a pre-flight weather
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briefing from flight service. The study also found that the participants did not pay
close attention to the surrounding general conditions and just looked at if it was
legal at the time of the flight. The researchers drew the conclusion that many pilots
will look for the ceilings and visibility but not pay attention to whether there are
other signs of degrading conditions. The study also found that pilots who
encountered IMC inflight also paid attention to any weather information that came
through the radio. Gallo et al. found that in response to the inclement weather, the
participants either diverted as they noticed conditions deteriorating or made a 180degree turn out of the weather. None of the pilots who participated in the study
attempted to continue to fly through the IMC. One participant stated that they
attempted to try to climb above the weather but opted to return to the departure
airport when they were unable to out-climb it. Finally, the researchers found that
all of the participants had a greater appreciation for the weather and the hazards it
poses than they did prior to the encounter. The findings of the Gallo et al. (2015)
study are important to understanding VFR in IMC situations. Because most of the
VFR into IMC accidents are lethal, rarely are researchers able to gain insight into
the thought processes of the pilots. In the Gallo et al. (2015) study, the researchers
were able to analyze the decision-making of pilots who actually encountered a VFR
into IMC situation. This gives a more accurate representation than even a simulator
study because, in a simulator study, the participants are not at risk. However,
qualitative analyses have limitations due to their subjective nature and being
subject to the deterioration of participants’ memories of events.
Similar to the Gallo et al. (2015) study, a study by Ison (2014) examined
attributes of pilots who were involved in a VFR into IMC situation. Ison reviewed
accident reports and examined factors that correlated with fatal VFR into IMC
situations. Ison extracted the following facts as potential correlate factors for VFR
into IMC accidents: terrain, time of day, weather briefing, flight plan, age, total
flight hours, pilot certificate, and whether they were in contact with ATC. He used
logistic regression to determine the correlations between the factors and VFR into
IMC accident reports pulled from the NTSB accident database. The results of the
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Ison (2014) study showed that only two of the factors, terrain, and weather briefing,
were found to be significant predictors (p < .005). Pilots who were involved in
VFR into IMC accidents were 19 times more likely to receive a weather briefing
and ten times more likely to be flying over mountainous terrain. These results are
also similar to the findings of the Gallo et al. (2015) study in that they found that
pilots who were involved in VFR into IMC encounters had received a weather
briefing. Ison (2014) explains these findings are due to mountainous terrain
obscuring bad weather and often having rapidly changing weather. He further
explains that pilots who receive weather briefings may willfully disregard or
unintentionally miss warning signs of inclement weather. The Ison (2014) study
also found that as experience and certificate level increased, there was a tendency
for VFR into IMC accidents to decrease. He explains this as being due to the
ability to judge whether improving with experience and training.
Wiegmann et al. (2002) examined the role situational assessment and flight
experience played in pilots’ decisions to continue flying VFR into IMC.
Wiegmann et al. (2002) hypothesized that most VFR into IMC accidents were due
to poor situational assessment as opposed to other factors such as an inflexibility to
changing plans. Wiegmann et al. (2002) conducted a study where 36 private pilots
flew a simulated cross-country flight. They were asked to treat the flight as they
would in the real world. The participants were responsible for flying the aircraft,
navigating, and paying attention to traffic and weather changes. The participants
were divided into two groups. The first group had the weather go IFR shortly after
takeoff, and the second group had the weather go IFR shortly before landing. The
study found that all 36 participants continued flying past the point where the
weather degraded—thirty-five of the participants diverted to another airport while
one participant crashed. The number of times participants continued flying in
inclement weather varied greatly. Participants continued flying from anywhere
from 0.45 minutes to 5.8 minutes. The median continuation time was 2.49 minutes.
The participants who encountered IMC earlier on in the flight continued flying
significantly longer than the participants who encountered IMC towards the end of
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the flight (p< .05). The researchers calculated situation assessment by taking the
participants’ estimates of the ceiling and visibility conditions and comparing them
with the actual conditions. They found that one-third of the participants accurately
estimated the weather conditions. Approximately twenty-seven percent
overestimated the weather conditions, while the remaining 40% underestimated the
weather conditions. Wiegmann et al. (2002) found that there was a negative
correlation between experience and the length of time pilots continued to fly into
inclement weather. The lower-time pilots were more likely to continue to fly into
inclement weather conditions.
The Wiegmann et al. (2002) study is important in the discussion regarding
pilots who fly VFR into IMC because it conducted an experiment that allowed
pilots to make the decisions they would if actually confronted with unexpected
IMC during the route of their flight. It also indicates that a majority of pilots are not
great at accurately estimating weather conditions. It also indicates that new pilots
are more at risk for misjudging the weather and ending up in a dangerous situation
than experienced pilots. While the Wiegmann et al. (2002) study is dated, its major
findings have been supported by more recent studies such as Ison (2014).
A study by Batt and O’Hare (2005) examined Australian accident
investigation reports and categorized them into VFR into IMC, precautionary
landing, and weather avoidance categories. The researchers wanted to see what
behaviors pilots exhibited in the face of adverse weather. Batt and O’Hare’s data
search was limited to fixed-wing general aviation flights during the daytime. They
wanted to compare the behaviors of the pilots who flew into IMC, landed early, or
took avoidance measures. The Batt and O’Hare (2005) study found that there were
no significant differences in age or experience among the three groups of pilots.
The VFR into IMC incidents had a higher lethality than the precautionary landing
or weather avoidance group. The study also looked at when the decision to
continue into IMC, make a precautionary landing or take avoidance actions
occurred in comparison to the halfway point of the flight. Pilots who made a
precautionary landing or entered IMC were more likely to do so in the second half
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of the flight, while pilots who took avoidance action were more likely to do so
during the first half of the flight. The authors explain that this could be evidence
that the pilots who continued flying into IMC believed that the weather was not as
bad as it actually was, and they prioritized continuing the flight as planned and
reaching their destination. The authors proceeded to characterize the weather
avoidance group as questioning whether to continue the flight as planned and
focusing on the changing weather earlier on in the flight. The Batt and O’Hare
(2005) study is important for a discussion of VFR into IMC scenarios because it
brings the factor of the midway point into the equation. Pilots who have reached
the midway point may feel pressure, whether real or self-imposed, to continue the
flight to their original destination as planned. This is one of the operational pitfalls
identified by the FAA in the agency’s ADM research.
The Gallo et al. (2015), Ison (2014), Batt and O’Hare (2005), and Wiegman
(2002) studies all examined the characteristics of pilots who encountered a VFR
into IMC situation. They found that the pilots who did encounter VFR into IMC
tended to be inexperienced pilots who conducted proper flight planning. Because
the pilots appeared to have done their due diligence in planning the flight, it is
important to find out why, despite proper planning, pilots still entered inclement
weather. A series of studies by Walmsley and Gilbey (2016) looked at the effect of
cognitive biases on pilots’ decisions to continue flying into inclement weather. The
Walmsley and Gilbey (2016) studies looked at three common cognitive biases:
anchoring bias, confirmation bias, and outcome bias. Anchoring bias is the
tendency to rely on the first piece of information received. Confirmation bias is the
tendency to seek out information that supports an existing belief. Outcome bias is
where a decision-maker judges a decision based on whether the outcome was good
or bad. The study that examined anchoring bias took a sample of 196 participants
and presented them with a scenario containing poor weather but not fully IMC.
Half of the participants received a weather briefing describing good weather, and
half of them were given a weather briefing describing poor weather. The
participants were asked to make a comparative judgment about whether the weather
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in the scenario photograph was the same as, better, or worse than the weather
presented in the briefing. The results of this study showed that participants
exposed to the more positive “anchor” (i.e., the first information received) assessed
the clouds as higher than the participants exposed to the more negative anchor. In
other words, pilots who received a weather briefing forecasting higher ceilings
assessed the actual conditions as better than if they received a briefing forecasting a
lower ceiling. Walmsley and Gilbey (2016) found that both novice and
experienced pilots responded to the anchoring in the same way.
The second study by Walmsley and Gilbey (2016) looked at confirmation
bias. This study used 278 participants who were asked to complete a series of five
weather-related decision-making scenarios. The participants were a mix of student
pilots, private pilots, commercial pilots, and airline transport pilots. The scenarios
consisted of pilots having to divert to the nearest airport due to some realistic
inflight scenario (ex., engine running rough or a passenger feeling ill). They were
each given three pieces of evidence to justify whether the flight was safe to
continue VFR. Two pieces of evidence supported continuing the flight, while one
did not support continuing the flight because the weather was not good enough for
VFR flight. The participants had to choose one of the pieces of evidence to support
their decision to divert to that airport. The results of this study found that the pilots
did not value the evidence that did not support continuing the flight over the ones
that did. The authors considered this to be a sign that the participants may have
been experiencing confirmation bias. They explained that having been presented
with evidence that the flight was not safe, they still chose to back their decision to
continue with the evidence that supported a VFR flight.
The third study by Walmsley and Gilbey (2016) looked at outcome bias
among general aviation pilots. The 280 participants of the study were presented
with randomly assigned outcomes for five scenarios. The textual scenarios
described the weather at the departure airport, destination airport, and en route (area
forecast). The scenarios then either presented the participants with a positive
outcome, a negative outcome, or no outcome for the control group. The
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participants were then instructed to rate whether they thought the decision was a
good decision or a poor decision. The results of the study demonstrated that a
decision with a negative outcome was judged as significantly worse than a decision
with a positive outcome (Walmsley and Gilbey, 2016). The results also indicate
that experience had no significant effect on whether the participants judged the
decision as good or poor. This meant that regardless of flight experience, the
participants who knew that there was a positive outcome judged the decision a
good. The results also indicated that participants who knew the outcome was a
negative one rated the scenario as riskier, and this finding was statistically
significant, p < .05. Again, like with the judgment of the decision, there was no
significant effect for experience or any interaction effects.
The findings of the Walmsley and Gilbey (2016) studies are important
because they indicate that pilots may experience cognitive biases when it comes to
making weather-related decisions. The first study indicates that pilots do suffer
from anchoring bias. This means that pilots may continue making a decision off on
the first piece of information they obtain, such as a weather briefing earlier in the
day. The second study indicates that pilots may then seek out information that
confirms what they already believe. This means that if pilots believe the weather
was fine, they could seek out information that supports that and mentally block
information that does not confirm their beliefs. The third study indicates that when
pilots know an outcome, they may judge their decision based on that. If a pilot
flew through IMC and landed safely, they could judge the act as safe because
nothing went wrong. Understanding that pilots experience these biases is important
because such biases could lead to poor decisions and result in a VFR into IMC
situation. If pilots know that they could be experiencing a cognitive bias, they
could take actions to avoid it influencing their decision.

Behavior and Characteristics of Pilots Who Fly VFR into IMC
A study by Hunter et al. (2011) examined the personal characteristics of
pilots who encountered adverse weather in flight. Hunter et al. (2011) had
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participants complete an online questionnaire consisting of 53 questions regarding
experience with adverse weather in the past five years. The study had 364 usable
responses. Of those responses, 144 participants reported entering adverse weather,
114 participants reported flying when the weather was a concern, and 106
participants had not entered adverse weather or flew a flight where adverse weather
was a concern. The questionnaire consisted of general questions such as when and
where the event occurred, questions about the content of the weather briefing,
questions about the configuration and equipment of the aircraft, and perception
questions about whether it was difficult to maintain control and whether the
participants perceived the event as dangerous. The participants also had to complete
a 10-item risk perception and pilot judgment scale. The study found that 57%
percent of the pilots in the in-weather group, 41% of the pilots in the near-weather,
and 59% of the pilots in the no-weather group did not hold instrument ratings
(Hunter et al., 2011). It also found that 46% of the pilots who flew near-weather
had an aircraft equipped with autopilot, and 34% of pilots who flew into weather
had an autopilot. However, of those, only half actually were using it. This meant
that pilots flying in or near hazardous weather situations were not using all of the
tools they had at their disposal, which goes against what pilots are taught. The most
surprising finding of the Hunter et al. (2011) study was that 32% of the participants
deliberately entered the weather despite not being qualified to do so. The Hunter et
al. (2011) study is important in a discussion of VFR flight into IMC because it
found that a majority of pilots who fly into weather did not hold instrument ratings.
This is even though the practice is not only illegal but incredibly dangerous. The
authors explain that civil aviation authorities around the world have spent years
expressing that flying into IMC when unqualified is deadly. Yet, the results of the
study indicate that pilots are not getting the message. Furthermore, the study found
that 32% of the participants did so deliberately, knowing they were not qualified to
do so. This finding indicates that pilots may either not care about or may not fully
understand the risks that they are taking by flying into IMC when not qualified.
Understanding this finding is crucial when trying to reduce the number of VFR into
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IMC accidents because it may indicate that a new approach to training and
information communication is necessary.
A study by Wiggins et al. (2012) followed the work of Hunter et al. (2011)
and looked at the characteristics of the pilots who reported deliberate versus
inadvertent entry into IMC. The study consisted of a questionnaire in which
participants had to reflect on an aviation occurrence in the preceding six months.
The study had a sample of 251 certificated pilots, of which 117 held an instrument
rating. The participants included in the sample all reported a situation of entering
IMC while operating a VFR flight. Of the instrument-rated pilots, approximately
53% of them entered the IMC inadvertently, approximately 69% of the noninstrument-rated pilots entered the IMC inadvertently. The remaining 47% and
31% of the pilots, respectively, reported entering the IMC intentionally. These are
important findings because even if a pilot holds an instrument rating, they cannot
enter IMC without an IFR clearance. Forty-seven percent of the instrument-rated
participants deliberately violated a regulation by entering IMC. While a smaller
percentage of the non-instrument-related pilots intentionally entered the IMC, it
was still nearly a third of the non-instrument-rated participants who violated
weather minimums. The authors found that instrument-rated pilots had a lower risk
perception of their actions. Wiggins et al. explain that this finding is logical
because instrument-rated pilots are trained to enter IMC on a regular basis.
Interestingly, the authors found no significant main effect for possession of an
instrument rating on advertently flying into IMC. This means that simply being
instrument rated does not increase one’s chances of flying VFR into IMC.
However, it does indicate a lower risk perception which could lead to the decision
to intentionally enter IMC. The Wiggins et al. (2012) study again supports that a
large minority of pilots continue to enter IMC while flying VFR despite it not being
safe or legal to do so. It also brings to the body of knowledge regarding VFR into
IMC scenarios that instrument ratings alone do not increase the likelihood of flying
VFR into IMC but could lower a pilot’s perception of the risk of doing so. The
findings also raise the point that the current methods of educating pilots to avoid
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VFR into IMC may not be working because some pilots simply do not perceive
entering IMC as very risky.
A study by Woods et al. (2020) examined the effect that motivation had on
pilots’ decisions to continue flying into IMC. The participants were randomly
assigned either intrinsic, extrinsic, or no-motivation scenarios. This was
manipulated by each scenario explaining the motivation for the flight. Going to
visit family was the intrinsic motivator, receiving non-refundable tickets to a big
game was the extrinsic motivator, and wanting to check out an aviation museum
was the example of no motivation. Each participant, regardless of the motivation
scenario, experienced VMC, Marginal VMC, and IMC. The study imposed a
limitation that the aircraft was VFR only, so even if the participants were
instrument-rated, they could not legally fly IFR. The participants knowing the
scenario, answered a series of survey questions that addressed their decisionmaking process. There were 454 usable responses nearly evenly distributed
between the three motivation types. The study found that there was no significant
main effect between the type of motivation and a willingness to continue flying.
Woods et al. did find a significant main effect between the type of weather and a
willingness to continue the flight as planned (p< .05). This meant that pilots who
encountered VMC were much more likely to continue a VFR flight than those who
encountered marginal or IMC conditions. They did find a slight but significant
interaction (p<.05) between the type of motivation and weather conditions on the
willingness to continue flying. Further analysis on this interaction found that
participants in the no-motivation group were less likely to continue flying in
marginal weather than the participants in the intrinsic and extrinsic motivation
groups. The Woods et al. (2020) study adds that differing types of motivation do
not appear to have an effect on whether pilots continue to complete a flight as
planned when faced with deteriorating weather conditions. This is an important
finding when discussing pilots’ decisions to continue flying VFR into IMC because
it appears that the type of motivation is not contributing to pilot decisions to
continue VFR into IMC. The only situation in which motivation appears to have an
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effect on pilots’ willingness to continue flying VFR into IMC is that pilots with no
motivation for their flight, i.e., flying because they had nothing else to do, were less
likely to continue in marginal weather conditions. What did have a significant
effect, according to Woods et al., were the weather conditions. As the weather
conditions degraded, fewer pilots were willing to continue flying as planned.
However, as seen in previous studies, there were still a few participants who were
still willing to continue flying into IMC conditions despite it being both illegal and
unsafe. Woods et al. theorized that those participants were willing to persist not
due to motivational reasons but due to poor judgment of the weather or improper
risk assessment.

Training and Experience of Pilots Who Fly VFR into IMC
One of the themes indicated by prior research into the issue of VFR flight
into IMC is that pilots have a limited understanding of the risks posed by IMC. As
Gallo et al. (2015) found, pilots who had an inadvertent encounter with IMC were
more appreciative of the weather and the threat that it poses to safe flight.
However, since these encounters are often lethal to pilots and passengers, being
able to convey those lessons to pilots without them inadvertently entering IMC is
incredibly important. Whitehurst et al. (2019) conducted a study that looked at the
effect experimental education had on pilots’ decision-making in the face of a VFR
into IMC situation. The Whitehurst et al. (2019) study provided two educational
interventions. The first intervention was a series of videos that provided tips on
estimating visibility in changing weather and then followed up by a video of a
flight entering IMC. The second intervention was the same tips on estimating
visibility, but instead of a video, participants had to hand fly a flight in a PC-based
flight simulator. The 36 participants were randomly assigned to one of three
groups, the first intervention, the second intervention, or a control group. The
control group flew the scenario but did not receive any experimental education
intervention. After experiencing the interventions, the pilots were asked to fly a
flight in a simulator while vocalizing their decision-making processes. Whitehurst
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et al. (2019) wanted to know whether the interventions had an effect on pilots’
decisions to continue flying. The results indicated that none of the factors
examined, such as intervention type, age, flight hours, or situational awareness,
were statistically significant at the .05 level. However, the relationship between
intervention type and decision-making approached significance (p = .054). The
authors stated that they believed the small sample size of 36 was the reason behind
the lack of significance. They believed that potentially, there could be a significant
relationship if there was a larger sample size. The authors did express that while
there was not a statistically significant relationship between the experimental
interventions and decision-making, there is evidence from a practical standpoint
that current initial and recurrent training methods are not doing enough to train
pilots to avoid bad weather. They justified this claim due to the slight increase in
participants’ ability to estimate weather after engaging in the experimental
education models.
Major et al. (2017) conducted a mixed-methods study looking at VFR into
IMC-related accidents. They conducted a search through the NTSB and AOPA
databases and conducted a survey of pilots across the United States. The analysis
of accident reports found an average of 31.9 VFR into IMC accidents per year over
a 10-year period from 2003-2012. They found that these accidents had an 87%
fatality rate which is consistent with previous analyses of VFR into IMC events.
They also found that the top three age groups for VFR into IMC accidents were
pilots aged 60-69, 50-59, and 40-49. Sixty-eight percent of all VFR into IMC
accident pilots were in one of these three age ranges. Interestingly, 32% of pilots
involved in VFR into IMC accidents held an instrument rating; however, it is
unknown if they were current at the time of their accidents. The survey component
of the study consisted of a 74-question survey on cockpit weather information; only
four of the survey items were analyzed for the paper as they were the only
questions relevant to training and weather. The survey had 675 complete
responses. The survey indicated 55% of pilots felt that the review of weather
information during that last flight review was either non-existent or inadequate.
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Flight reviews are an opportunity for recurrent training of general aviation pilots to
improve their skills and correct bad habits, as well as introduce new technologies
and procedures to pilots who may not have had formal training in years. The survey
also found that only 47% of general aviation pilots believed that their training
prepared them very well or well for dealing with real-life weather events.
Additionally, many pilots cited lack of knowledge and real-world weather
experience as deficiencies in their flight training. Major et al. explain that previous
research has shown pilots struggle to interpret and apply weather information in the
cockpit. They explain that the responses to the survey items indicate that there are
gaps in the training pilots get regarding weather information and applying it in the
real world. The fact that a majority of pilots felt that current training practices
prepared them for real-world weather situations indicates that changes may be
needed to the existing flight training process, and flight reviews need to work on
teaching pilots to make real-world weather decisions. The Major et al. (2017) study
found that there is a gap in the weather-related decision-making of general aviation
pilots, and understanding that there are knowledge gaps is important to bring to a
discussion about decision-making during a VFR into IMC situation.
A study by Johnson and Wiegmann (2015) looked at the effect simulation
has on improving weather-related decision-making. Johnson and Wiegmann
(2015) explain that one of the issues in pilot training is that novice pilots are
restricted from flying in marginal weather conditions. While this is done out of
safety, since novice pilots lack the skills to safely navigate in degrading conditions,
it also limits their development of those skills. Simulators could play a unique role
in this area. Flight instructors can use simulators to introduce hazardous weather to
student pilots in a safe and controlled environment. However, simulators cannot
fully replicate how spatial disorientation feels in an actual aircraft. The Johnson
and Wiegmann (2015) study had participants fly a simulated VFR cross-country
flight, and IFR flight was not provided as an option even if the pilots were
instrument rated. The researchers measured the amount of time the participants
continued to fly into IMC. There were 32 participants, and they analyzed them
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based on whether they had an instrument rating or not, high time versus low time,
and simulated versus actual instrument experience. They found that 18 of the 32
pilots violated VFR weather minimums, and 7 of them flew all the way to the
destination despite IMC prevailing. They found that pilots with more actual-IMC
time diverted sooner than pilots with low actual-IMC experience. Additionally,
pilots with more simulated instrument time diverted sooner than pilots with less
simulated instrument time. The authors found that all of the participants used GPS
for at least some portion of the flight. The results of the Johnson and Wiegmann
(2017) study indicate that having more experience in actual real-world weather
conditions is related to better weather-related decision-making. They also found
that pilots with more actual-IMC experience were better at communicating their
situation than the other groups of pilots. An interesting finding is that high-time
pilots who simply hold an instrument rating did not make as good of decisions as
pilots who specifically had large amounts of actual-IMC time. This finding
supports their conclusion that having experience with real-world weather is what
drives weather decision-making. There are some practical limitations to this from a
training standpoint. It would not be safe to have low-time pilots fly into severe
weather or even marginal weather conditions. This could be a potential use for
simulators in the future to expose low-time pilots to hazardous weather situations.

Use of Electronic Flight Bags for Support of Decision-Making
One of the most significant innovations of the 21st century is the
widespread adoption of the EFB. The FAA defines EFBs as “an electronic display
system intended primarily for cockpit or cabin use (FAA, 2007, p. 4).” Originally,
EFBs were large, bulky, standalone devices that were built into the aircraft.
Currently, many EFBs are mobile applications that can be loaded onto tablet
computers such as Apple’s iPad. Modern EFB applications carry digital aeronautic
charts, airport diagrams, instrument procedure diagrams and provide flight
planning, navigation, and weather functions. What once used to be a wide variety
of paper resources is now contained in one place on a mobile device. Updates to
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charts and procedures can be automatically downloaded to ensure pilots are using
the most up-to-date resources. The FAA allows pilots to use EFBs to supplement
or even replace paper-based resources as long as the charts are up to date and the
EFB system does not interfere with the aircraft’s systems (FAA, 2007).
Additionally, while many EFBs have some navigation features, EFBs cannot be
used as a primary source of navigation information. EFBs have been adopted by
Part 91 operators, and the FAA has approved EFBs for use by Part 135 air charter
operators and Part 121 air carriers (FAA, 2017). Although there are limited
requirements for EFBs for Part 91 operators as those are mainly non-commercial,
there are greater certification requirements for EFBs used by Part 135 and 121
commercial operators.

EFB Safety Background
Whenever a new technology is widely adopted by aviation, it is important to
ensure there are no safety concerns that arise due to this new technology. A study
by Chase and Hiltunen (2014) analyzed reports from the ASRS database in order to
identify potential issues resulting from the adoption of EFBs. They included reports
that were submitted by pilots or copilots and cited EFB use as a contributing factor.
They analyzed reports from 1994-2014. During that 20-year window, they found
239 reports that met their criteria. Some common issues they found were
information being out of date, digital information not matching paper information,
issues with scrolling and zoom making it difficult to gather information, and
legibility. Sixty-seven percent of the issues with information display had to do
with electronic charts, of which all of the commonly found issues applied. Chase
and Hiltunen (2014) quoted the narratives of the ASRS reports providing the
context of the types of incidents that have occurred due to EFB use. Many of these
incidents consisted of airspace violations because the EFB showed the pilots as
clear of airspace when they actually were not. Other issues involving EFBs
included difficulty finding and loading instrument procedures and airport diagrams,
altitude and heading deviations, and runway incursions. The Chase and Hiltunen
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(2014) analysis is a key part of the discussion about the use of EFBs because it is
important to understand that while EFBs are a great tool and provide a large
amount of information in a simple and organized manner, the use of EFBs can still
be problematic and result in safety issues. Pilots using EFBs should be aware that
the position information is not always accurate and should not rely on it to avoid
violating airspace. Additionally, pilots should note that there could be slight
differences in the renderings of digital charts from paper charts; understanding
these differences could prevent pilots from inadvertently violating airspace.
An article by Bhardwaj and Purdy (2019) discussed the human factors
concerns of general aviation pilots’ use of EFBs in flight. They conducted a
literature review and highlighted the concerns that EFBs pose. They cite a study
that found that as automation increased, communication between pilots in a multicrew environment decreased. They also explain that while EFBs used in
commercial aircraft are certified by the FAA, the ones used in general aviation are
not certified and could have software and hardware issues that arise in flight. One
major human factors concern brought up by Bhardwaj and Purdy is that humans
place a lot of trust in automation, but automation is only as good as the information
that it receives. If the wrong numbers are inputted into the EFB, then it will output
the wrong numbers. If pilots are treating fallible data as infallible, that could result
in a safety issue. Furthermore, Bhardwaj and Purdy explain that the use of
technology in the cockpit could lead to an increase in complacency and heads-down
time. The Bhardwaj and Purdy (2019) article explains the potential human factors
concerns involved with the use of EFBs in the general aviation cockpit. While
EFBs are incredibly convenient and can help reduce workload by organizing charts
and even providing weather information for situational awareness, there are still
human factors issues to keep in mind. As in other areas of aviation, Bhardwaj and
Purdy are not advocating that EFBs are a poor tool, but they are reminding the
aviation research community that this tool has the potential to lead to safety issues,
and the industry should take steps to prevent EFB use from resulting in an incident
or accident. The EFB manufacturers, flight training organizations, and regulators
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such as the FAA could stress the importance of understanding that EFBs are not
infallible and that it only serves as an aid to situational awareness and not a primary
means of navigation. Taking actions like these could bring awareness to potential
pitfalls created by the widespread adoption of EFBs and possibly prevent an
incident.
Both the Bhardwaj and Purdy (2019) and the Chase and Hiltunen (2014)
articles demonstrate that although EFBs are excellent resources in the cockpit,
pilots should not put too much trust in them or use them as a primary means of
avoiding airspace, as they cannot be guaranteed to be accurate enough to do so.
However, as Bhardwaj and Purdy explain, it is human nature to trust automation.
The ASRS reports cited by Chase and Hiltunen (2014) support this line of thinking.
They cite three reports of pilots who were using their EFB to avoid airspace and
inadvertently entered it because the position was delayed. Had the pilots relied on
other sources such as visual landmarks or installed avionics, there is a chance that
they would not have violated the airspace. This lack of accuracy is why EFBs are
considered by the FAA to be situational awareness tools. They can aid in the
development of situational awareness and can be immensely helpful, but they are
only to be used as assistance devices.

EFB Use and Decision-making
Although EFB use poses potential safety concerns, EFBs are support tools
and provide pilots large amounts of information in an organized fashion. A study
by Misra and Halleran (2019) explored the effects of EFBs on aeronautical
decision-making. The sample consisted of 40 student and private pilots who had
used an EFB during their flight training. The participants had to plan a flight
between two specified cities; half of the participants were instructed to do so on an
EFB, and the other half were instructed to do so with paper resources. The route
was chosen as it brought participants through the Washington, DC Special Flight
Rules Area (SFRA) and IMC. The participants were asked to plan for the flight as
if they were actually going to fly it and gather all necessary information. The

46

participants then answered a questionnaire that sought to gather evidence of the
participants’ flight planning. The participants were evaluated on four components
of flight planning, NOTAMs, chart interpretation, weather products, flight
information. The Misra and Halleran (2019) study found that participants
performed better in all areas when they were using an EFB than if they were
planning the flight manually. The most similar area of performance was weather,
and the most dramatic difference in performance was in the interpretation of
NOTAMs, where participants planning via paper chart scored much lower than the
participants who planned via EFB. For example, only 65% of participants using
paper charts were able to find the DC SFRA, whereas 85% of the participants who
used the EFB were able to. Sixty-five percent of participants who used the EFB
detected the change in radio frequency at the destination, whereas only 35% of the
paper charts group detected the change. The performance on the weather tasks was
similar. Misra and Halleran explained that this indicates that pilots using EFBs
appear to perform better at flight planning and have more awareness of the
NOTAMs and hazards along the route of flight. They did explain this also shows a
need for the flight training industry to ensure that student pilots are also able to plan
a flight using traditional methods. They explain that these participants had learned
to fly using EFBs as their flight planning method and had not had much exposure to
the traditional methods. This indicates that while EFB use streamlines the flight
planning process and allows pilots to gather large amounts of necessary
information, pilots trained this way lack the skills to process and delineate
information from the raw data. This would be important because EFBs are not
infallible, and pilots should be competent in using traditional flight planning
methods if their EFBs fail. The Misra and Halleran (2019) study provides
interesting insight into the performance of pilots in planning flights using EFBs
versus traditional methods. It also demonstrates that EFBs are excellent aids to
situational awareness if used properly.
A study by Haddock and Beckman (2015) looked at how the use of EFBs
affected pilot performance during instrument approaches. Instrument procedures
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have been an area where EFBs have proved useful because no longer do pilots have
to carry bulky binders with instrument procedures, but they can save official
procedure charts to their EFB and access them as needed. This study consisted of
14 commercial pilot students who were asked to fly a simulated instrument
approach in a flight training device. The flight training device was configured to
resemble a single-engine fixed-gear aircraft. Participants were scored relative to
the instrument pilot practical test standards, which were the standards used by
examiners on FAA Practical Tests at the time. The participants flew two
approaches, one with an EFB and another using paper charts. The researchers were
recording the following metrics: altitude, heading, airspeed, localizer course, and
time to set up approach, and whether they correctly identified the minimums
(Haddock & Beckman, 2015). The results indicated that pilots using EFB scored
significantly better (p< .05) on the instrument approach tasks than the pilots who
used paper charts. For example, pilots who used paper charts only correctly
identified minimums 36% of the time on the first attempt, but the pilots using the
EFB correctly identified minimums 100% of the time. Additionally, paper chart
users attempted to use the wrong chart 29% of the time. Using the wrong chart
could be catastrophic during an actual approach in IMC. Interestingly, of the
participants, 71% had never used an iPad as an EFB. This was an interesting detail
because it indicates that their increase in performance was not due to another factor
like familiarity with the EFB but that the EFB and its presentation of information
increased performance on instrument approach-related tasks. Eighty-six percent of
the participants felt that using the EFB made the flying task much easier. These
findings suggest that EFBs and their easy-to-use interface improve performance
with little training necessary. Haddock and Beckman explain that one thing to keep
in mind as a limitation of the study is that they used college students for their
sample. While these students had not used an iPad-based EFB before, they were
most likely familiar with the iPad and its use, which could put them at an advantage
in learning the interface over the rest of the pilot population.
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Both the Misra and Halleran (2019) and Haddock and Beckman (2015)
studies demonstrate that EFBs increase pilot performance. One possible
explanation for this is the streamlined user interface that makes it easier to find
information. No longer does a pilot have to organize paper charts, navigation logs,
terminal procedures, airport diagrams, and notes; all of these items can be stored
within an EFB application on an iPad. This is in addition to the weather and
sometimes even traffic information that can be displayed on an EFB. This allows
pilots to have all of their flight information at their fingertips, making it easy to
access information during busy and typically risky phases of flight. Understanding
the benefits of EFBs helps frame the reason for their widespread adoption and nearubiquity in 2021. Understanding that adopting new technology can make the
modern pilot more situationally aware is important, especially from the pilot
decision-making frame of reference.

Summary of Literature
Flying is a complicated task, and as such, ADM is a complex process.
Previous research into ADM identified a variety of operational pitfalls, which are
behavioral patterns that could preclude pilots from making sound aeronautical
decisions. Some of these pitfalls, such as get-there-itis and continuing the flight as
planned, could potentially come into play when pilots are facing a VFR into IMC
situation. Other ADM research identified five attitudes that are hazardous to safe
flight. Pilots who hold these attitudes could be more likely to fly into IMC
conditions. Research examining how pilots adhere to their personal minimums
found that a vast majority of pilots violated both their personal and FAAestablished weather minimums. Previous research has also found that pilots share a
common weather-decision-making model regardless of country and that pilots
make decisions differently based upon experience. Research into weather-related
decision making has found that the use of decision-support tools increased
performance and the number of weather deviations
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However, research into VFR into IMC scenarios found that most pilots who
used synthetic vision systems continued to fly into IMC conditions despite
operating under VFR and that increased GPS use with a moving map display
related to an increase in unintended VFR into IMC incidents. This appears to
indicate that some pilots may use decision support tools to continue flying into
hazardous weather. Additionally, research shows that most pilots have poor
weather knowledge and that most pilots who flew VFR into IMC received a preflight weather briefing Interestingly, pilots flying VFR who had encounters with
IMC weather were more likely to be instrument-rated. Pilots who had flown VFR
into IMC before and had a greater risk tolerance were more likely to have
deliberately entered the conditions than have inadvertently done so. Pilots who
encountered IMC earlier during their flight were more likely to continue on than
those who encountered it later.
The review of the literature of EFBs found there are numerous human
factors issues that arise when EFBs are used. For example, pilots may trust EFB
position information as infallible. However, it is not, and there are numerous
instances of pilots violating airspace as a result of utilizing EFBs for position
information. Additionally, EFBs have many other features, such as weight and
balance and performance features. The data output by those features is only as
good as the information input into them. Despite numerous human factors
concerns, EFBs are a valuable tool in the cockpit that allow pilots to carry what
used to be a large assortment of paper charts in one compact electronic device and
can help improve performance. Research that looked at the impact of EFBs on
performance found that the use of an EFB had a significant increase in performance
in every metric except weather information when compared to traditional paper
charts in flight planning. The levels of performance between EFB and paper charts
were roughly equal for weather information. Another study looked at the effect of
EFBs on performance during an instrument approach. They found that using an
EFB significantly increased performance in every metric.
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Gaps in the Research
The thorough review of the literature regarding ADM, VFR into IMC
situations, and EFBs showed some gaps in the literature. There is research that
could be conducted to examine the relationship between the presence of hazardous
attitudes and a decision to continue VFR flight into IMC. If there are relationships
between certain attitudes and the decision to fly VFR into IMC, this could
influence changes to instructional programs. Previous research has also found that
while decision-support tools such as EFBs increase pilot performance, there is
evidence that pilots using some of these tools continue flying in poor conditions
despite having more information at their fingertips. A gap in the literature is
whether the moving map display on modern EFBs is used like the moving map on
panel-mount GPS units. A moving map display presents an aeronautical chart that
is GPS referenced and moves with the aircraft. Suppose pilots use the moving map
display on the EFB the same as the display on the GPS. In that case, pilots may be
using them to continue flying into poor weather, especially when weather radar
information is superimposed onto the moving map display. There has been no
research found to date that explores whether access to weather radar information
superimposed onto a moving map display affects pilot decisions to fly VFR into
IMC. A pilot with the weather on a moving map display could attempt to find gaps
in the radar return (the image seen on a radar display) and try to fly through them
despite the fact that a clear radar return cannot always guarantee VFR conditions.
Additionally, no research found to date examines the role that the presence of
airspace restrictions along the route of flight has on influencing a pilot’s decision to
continue VFR into IMC. There is evidence that many pilots who fly VFR into IMC
do not recognize the degrading weather conditions as a threat. However, pilots are
aware that violating restricted airspace is a threat. This raises the unexplored
question of whether proximity to restricted airspace influences a pilot’s decision to
continue VFR into IMC. Perhaps a pilot who does not consider flying in poor
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weather a risk might respond in a different manner if there was a chance of
violating restricted airspace.
The gaps in the existing literature on the topic of VFR into IMC indicate
that more research is needed in order to understand the effects that modern
technology has on pilots’ decisions to continue flying VFR into IMC. Does having
access to advanced technology such as an EFB influence pilot decisions to
continue? These are important questions to answer because VFR into IMC
accidents are still common and still incredibly lethal. Understanding these effects
could help shape new training programs that attempt to convey to pilots the hazards
of flying VFR into IMC and how to use technology, such as EFBs, in a way that
increases safety instead of enabling pilots to take riskier actions.
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Chapter 3: Methods
Introduction
The current study examined the effects of EFB graphical weather
information and graphical depictions of airspace restrictions on general aviation
pilots’ decisions to continue flying VFR into IMC, including any potential
interaction between the two independent variables.

Experimental Design
The study was a mixed-methods study utilizing a between-subjects
experimental design. The participants were randomly divided into groups and
exposed to one of four conditions described later. Their response was assessed, and
they were then asked a series of quantitative and qualitative questions regarding
their perception of risk, risk propensity, confidence in their decision, the difficulty
in making that decision, why they made their decision, as well as if they would act
differently in an actual aircraft. A mixed-methods design was chosen because
qualitative data provides information as to why an observed phenomenon occurred.

Variables
Independent Variables
There were two primary independent variables in this study. The first was
the presence of EFB weather radar information (present vs. not); the second was the
presence of graphical depictions of airspace restrictions (present vs. not). The EFB
weather was displayed as a graphical display of weather radar information on the
EFB moving map. The airspace restriction was displayed as a red temporary flight
restriction (TFR) ring superimposed on the EFB moving map. In total, there were
four conditions as defined in Table 1.
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Table 1. Study Conditions
IV 2: EFB Graphic Airspace
Restriction
Present
Not Present

IV 1: EFB Graphical Weather Display
Present
Not Present
Weather and Airspace
(WA)
Weather Only
(W)

Airspace Only
(A)
None
(N )

Dependent Variables
The proposed study had two primary dependent variables. The first
dependent variable of this study was the time the participants spent in IMC. The
second dependent variable was the decision response. This decision could be to
return to the departure airport, divert, or continue. The time the participants spent
in the IMC was a continuous variable, while the decision made was a categorical
variable.

Exploratory Dependent Variables Measured
Additional variables measured included age, gender, certificate level, flight
experience, confidence, risk perception, risk propensity, and difficulty in making
decisions. Age was a continuous variable. Gender, certificate level, and weather
judgment were categorical variables. Flight experience, decision confidence, risk
perception, risk propensity, and decision difficulty were continuous variables.

Participants
Target Population
The target population was general aviation pilots who operate single-engine
land aircraft under Part 91 of the Federal Aviation Regulations. Examples of these
pilots are pilots who fly the Cessna 172 Skyhawk or Piper PA-28 Cherokee aircraft.
The study did not limit the type of FAA pilot certificate a participant could hold if
they held a minimum of a private pilot certificate. This was because pilots of
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differing certificate levels fly general aviation aircraft. Some general aviation
pilots hold private pilot certificates, while others hold commercial or airline
transport pilot certificates.

Accessible Population
The accessible population was general aviation pilots at flight schools in
Florida, Maryland, Alaska, and New York, as well as flying clubs across the United
States. The flight schools were a mix of Part 61, Part 141, and Collegiate Part 141
programs representing the main types of civilian flight training programs in the
United States. The flying clubs were contacted via the AOPA Flying Clubs
Facebook group and their Club Connector newsletter. Additionally, pilots in the
FAA’s General Aviation Safety, Plane Crazy, The Aviators Lounge, and Flights
Above Southeast Facebook groups were also asked to participate in the study. The
sample selection strategy was a convenience sample as the members of the
accessible populations were contacted due to their ease of access via email lists and
social media. An a priori power analysis for an Analysis of Variance (ANOVA)
with two independent variables and one dependent variable was conducted in
G*Power to determine sufficient sample size using an alpha of .05, a power of .8,
and an effect size of .25. The power analysis found that a sample size of 128
participants was necessary to find a medium effect size.

Experimental Task
The participants completed the experimental task virtually. The
experimental instrument consisted of the following components: an informed
consent form, a simulated preflight weather briefing, an interactive video of a
simulated VFR flight, including a simulated EFB application, and a post-scenario
questionnaire.

Preflight Weather Briefing
The preflight weather briefing for the scenario was delivered in a textual
format to all participants. It contained the current and previous aviation weather
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report (METAR) for the departure and destination airports, a terminal aerodrome
forecast (TAF) for the arrival and destination airports, notices to airmen
(NOTAMs), and a textual description of the weather in the general area for the
previous 24 hours. While it was not as comprehensive as it would be for a crosscountry flight, it was similar to the preflight planning conducted prior to a local
VFR flight. Figure 1 shows the weather briefing that the participants received.

Figure 1. Preflight Weather Briefing
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Video of Simulated VFR Flight
The interactive video was of a simulated, local (i.e., less than 50 nmi in
length) VFR flight from Frederick Municipal Airport (KFDK) in Frederick, MD, to
Hagerstown Regional Airport (KHGR) in Hagerstown, MD. The straight-line
distance between the two airports is 24 nmi. However, due to an impending visit to
Camp David by the President of the United States, the scenario route avoided but
was in close proximity to the extended TFR around P-40 and R-4009, which are the
permanent prohibited and restricted areas over Camp David, just to the east of the
intended route of flight. The route had the pilot fly west to Harpers Ferry and then
turn north to Hagerstown. The distance for the flight was approximately 34 nmi
The modified route of flight is depicted in Figure 2. In the A and WA conditions,
the TFR was active and depicted graphically. In the W and N conditions, the TFR
was active but not depicted graphically. Although the TFR was not depicted
graphically in the W and N conditions, the NOTAM for the TFR was available
textually in the preflight briefing package in all conditions. In all scenario
conditions, the flight route was be designed to avoid P-40 and the Presidential TFR.
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Figure 2. Depiction of the VFR Flight Plan from KFDK-KHGR via Harpers Ferry

The participants were told that the purpose of the flight was to take the
aircraft to maintenance to replace an inoperative attitude indicator, and as such, the
aircraft was not able to be flown IFR. The video started just after takeoff from
KFDK, and the scenario showed the departure and transition to level flight. In the
video, which depicted a first-person view of the pilot flying, the participant was
presented with the out-the-window view, the instrument panel, and the EFB
display, which presented the moving map. The EFB display was located in the
lower right-hand corner. All participants were given an EFB with a moving map
display. The A group had the moving map with airspace only; the W group had the
moving map with graphical depictions of weather on it; the WA group had the
moving map with graphical depictions of airspace and weather, the N group had a
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moving map with nothing superimposed onto it. Approximately a minute after
leveling off, the weather started to gradually degrade until it dropped below VFR
minimums. The participants were timed from when the weather became IMC,
which was approximately three to four minutes into the flight, until they made a
decision to return to the departure airport, divert to another airport, or the scenario
ended. If the participant reached the end of the seven-minute video scenario
without making a decision, then that was interpreted as making the decision to
continue on to the destination. The video had two buttons located in the top right
corner of the screen with the options to return to the departure airport or divert.
The participants were told to treat the scenario like a normal VFR flight, make
decisions as if they were in an actual aircraft, and press the button if at any point
they believe modifying the flight plan is prudent. If the participant pressed one of
the two “decision” buttons, then it would pause the video, and the participant will
be prompted to complete the post-experiment questionnaire.

Experimental Setup
The informed consent document, demographic questionnaire, experimental
scenarios, and the post-scenario questionnaire were all delivered to the participants
via an online Qualtrics questionnaire. This allowed the users to click one link and
partake in the entire study without having to navigate to multiple sites. Qualtrics
randomized the conditions presented to each participant. The video footage for
scenario flight was created by recording a flight flown in Lockheed Martin’s
Prepar3d flight simulator software, and the EFB footage consisted of a screen
recording of Boeing’s Foreflight mobile EFB application. The EFB was connected
to the simulator via a program called GPSvr, allowing the simulated GPS location
to be displayed on the EFB. The videos were combined and made interactive using
a software package called Mindstamp, which allows for the creation of interactive
videos. Figure 3 depicts the interactive video interface that the participants saw.
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Note. The interactive video interface included the pilot’s eye view from the
Mooney M-20 cockpit, the EFB application with intervention treatments, and the
“Return to KFDK” and “Divert to KMRB” buttons.
Figure 3. Screenshot of Interactive video interface- for WA Condition

Measures
Pre-Scenario Measures
Demographics. The first set of questions was a short demographic survey with
questions collecting information on age, gender, certificate level, flight experience
in hours, experience with EFB applications, and experience with the scenario (i.e.,
flying VFR in the Washington, D.C. area). The demographics questionnaire can be
found in Appendix A.

In-Scenario Measures
During the scenario, data to calculate the time participants remain in IMC,
as well as the participants’ decisions to either divert or return to KFDK, were
captured automatically by Mindstamp. The time the participants remained in the
IMC was calculated by taking the amount of time the participants watched the
video scenario before making a decision to either divert or return to KFDK and
subtracting the amount of time the flight was in VMC weather (a constant) from it.
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The decision to divert or return was measured by the selection made by the
participant in the scenario to return to the departure airport, divert or continue.

Post-Scenario Questionnaire
After the scenario, the participants were asked to complete a short questionnaire in
order to collect more information about their decision.
Risk Perception. The participants’ risk perception was measured through a single
Likert-type question that asks how risky they perceived the flight scenario to be. It
was anchored using the seven-point anchoring system used by Blais and Weber
(2006) for their risk perception scale. The anchors ranged from not at all risky to
extremely risky and can be found in Appendix B.
Decision Confidence. The participants’ confidence was measured using a
modified version of a scale originally developed for measuring the confidence of
nursing students (Grundy, 1993). This scale was chosen because it is a short scale
that measures confidence in the performance of tasks. Additionally, nurses work in
a fast-paced and high-risk environment similar to pilots. The modified decision
confidence scale can be found in Appendix C.
Decision Difficulty. The participants’ perceptions of the difficulty of their
decision were measured using a scale developed by Shiloh et al. (2001). The
Shiloh et al. (2001) scale consisted of five dimensional items with seven points
each. The decision difficulty scale can be found in Appendix D.
Propensity Towards Risk. The participants were asked a series of seven
questions regarding their propensity towards risk in everyday life developed by
Meertens and Lion (2008). The propensity towards risk scale can be found in
Appendix E.
Judgment of Weather. The participants were asked to give an estimate of the
flight visibility and ceiling in order to gauge the participants’ interpretation of the
weather cues. This was measured by the participants typing in their estimate of the
visibility and ceiling into an open response question. This was similar to how it
was measured in the Ahlstrom (2019) study.
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Decision Factors. The final set of questions were qualitative in nature and
examined the factors that contributed to the pilot’s decision in the scenario and
whether the pilot would make a different decision in the real world. The
participants were asked why they made their choice, what factors contributed, and
if they would act differently in an actual airplane. These were open-ended response
questions at the end of the questionnaire.

Procedure
The participants were contacted through email via lists from Florida Tech,
AOPA, and a flyer put up in the lobby of a local flight school. Additionally, a link
to the survey was posted in multiple general aviation-related Facebook groups,
including Plane Crazy, Aviation Safety, and Pilots and Aviation Enthusiasts. In the
recruitment email/social media post, there was a brief description of the study, a
description of the inclusion criteria, and a link to the Qualtrics questionnaire.
When the questionnaire link was opened, it brought the participant to screening
questions to ensure they met the inclusion criteria. If participants met those
criteria, they were then presented with the informed consent form; once the
participant completed the informed consent, Qualtrics randomly presented one of
four scenarios (based on the condition to which they were randomly assigned).
Each of the four scenarios had the same VFR flight from KFDK to KHGR, during
which the weather dropped below VFR weather minimums. The scenarios differed
in whether they had a graphical depiction of the airspace restriction and whether the
participant had weather radar information superimposed on their EFB moving map.
Scenario N provided the participant with no graphical weather information and no
graphical depiction of the airspace restriction. Scenario W provided graphical
weather information and no graphical depiction of the airspace restriction.
Scenario A provided no graphical weather information and a graphical depiction of
the airspace restriction. Scenario WA provided graphical weather information and
a graphical depiction of the airspace restriction. The four scenarios were randomly
assigned and presented in a between-subjects format. This was designed to
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alleviate any learning effects from the repetition of the same scenario and
additionally reduced the time it took to complete the study, which could increase
the number of potential participants. Once the participants were assigned to a
condition, they clicked a link that brought them to the interactive video. Prior to
the video, the participants were informed that the video would take seven to ten
minutes, that they would need to direct their full attention to the entire length of the
video, and that once the video started, the participants would not be able to redo the
scenario. They were, however, allowed to come back if they could watch the video
immediately. They were prompted to watch the video and click the decision button
of their choice if at any point they decided to either divert or return to the departure
airport. If the participant played the video until the end, the participant would be
returned to Qualtrics to answer the post questionnaire. If the participant opted to
either divert or return to KFDK, the video would end at that point, and the
participants were returned to Qualtrics to answer the post questionnaire. Upon
completion of the questionnaire, Qualtrics presented a screen in which participants
were thanked for participating and prompted to exit the questionnaire.

Data Analysis
Once the data was collected, the CSV file from Qualtrics and the CSV file
from Mindstamp were combined in order to create the full dataset from which the
analyses were conducted. The Qualtrics output contained the quantitative and
qualitative questions, while the Mindstamp file contained the interactions with the
video scenario, including the time that a particular button was clicked. This click
time was used to calculate the amount of time the pilot flew into the IMC before
making a decision. This was calculated by subtracting the time IMC was entered,
which was a constant from the time the button was clicked.
The current study was a mixed-methods design collecting both quantitative
and qualitative data. The time data from the primary research question was
analyzed via a 2x2 Analysis of Variance (ANOVA). This analysis was appropriate
because the study evaluated the effects of two independent variables on one single
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continuous dependent variable, time in IMC. For the categorical data, a chi-square
test was conducted to see if there was a relationship between the two independent
variables and the decisions that were made (continue, divert, return to departure
airport). This was an appropriate test because I was comparing the categorical
independent variable of treatment condition with the categorical dependent variable
of the decision made. The exploratory research questions were answered using a
2x2 Multivariate Analysis of Covariance (MANCOVA) and a correlational matrix.
The qualitative data from the question asking what factors contributed to
their decision was analyzed using a thematic analysis in which themes were
extracted from the responses, categories were identified from the themes, and then
responses were categorized into these categories. The thematic analysis process
occurred as follows. All of the raw comments from the question being analyzed
were copied over into an Excel worksheet. Then the decision made by the
participants and whether the participants entered IMC were copied over, allowing
for the data to be grouped by decision for a comparison of the factors that
contributed to the pilots who made each type of decision. An initial read-through
of the participant responses was performed, and initial categories were extracted,
including visibility, cloud clearance, inoperative equipment, the safety of flight,
and other. Then each of the responses was assigned into one of these categories.
This was completed by copying and pasting the relevant quote into the column for
the appropriate category. The quote was copied so the categorizations could
quickly be reviewed later. Once the participant responses were categorized, a
second review was conducted, and categories were consolidated and participant
responses recategorized. This process continued until the remaining comments
were ones that were not relevant to the analysis (e.g., participants who commented
about how the route of flight was unrealistic). The irrelevant/individual comments
that did not fit anywhere else were included because they may have factored into
the participants’ decision but could not meaningfully provide insight into the
decision-making process. Once all of the participant responses were categorized,
the number of comments in each category was calculated.
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Chapter 4: Results
Descriptive Statistics
Sample Demographics
A total of 261 participants opened and completed some portion of the
survey. After excluding participants who did not complete the experimental task or
took significantly longer than 12 minutes and 30 seconds length of the video on the
scenario video (meaning they paused the video), the final sample consisted of 98
participants. Eighty-three (84.7%) of the participants were male. Eleven (11.2%)
of the participants were female. Four (4.1%) of the participants did not specify
their sex. The ages of the participants ranged from 18–72, with an average age of
41.39 years old (SD=16.7). Experience was measured in the number of flight
hours. The number of flight hours ranged from 60–31,500. The average number of
flight hours was 1,526 (SD= 3,637.69). Participants were asked how many years of
experience they had with EFBs. The number of years of experience participants
had with EFBs ranged from 0–25, with an average of 5 years (SD= 3.88). Because
the experimental scenario occurred near the Washington, DC SFRA, participants
were also asked if they had any experience flying in the Washington, DC SFRA.
Thirty-two participants responded that they had SFRA experience, and the average
amount of SFRA experience was 7.44 years (SD=8.93). Participants were also
asked which FAA pilot certification region they were from; this was to assess
individual differences based on the region in which they fly. The breakdown of
participants by pilot certification region is presented in Table 2.
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Table 2. Participants by FAA Certification Region

Region

N

%

Eastern

15

15.3

Southern

25

25.5

Great Lakes

11

11.2

Central

7

7.1

Southwest

15

15.3

Northwest Mountain

8

8.2

Western Pacific

14

14.3

Alaskan

3

3.1

Total

98

100

Note. There are nine regions for pilot certification under the FAA. The ninth
region is foreign, which are holders of FAA pilot certificates abroad. No foreign
certificate holders participated in the study.
The study only included pilots who held a minimum of a private pilot
certificate, meaning that student, sport, and recreational pilot certificate holders
were not included in the study. This meant that the participants could either hold a
private pilot certificate, a commercial pilot certificate, or an airline transport pilot
certificate. Table 3 presents the breakdown of participants by certificate level.
Table 3. Pilot Certificates Held by Participants

Certificate Level

N

%

Private Pilot

51

52%

Commercial Pilot

37

38%

Airline Transport Pilot

10

10%

Participants were also asked if they were instrument rated. Sixty-eight
(69.4%) of participants reported that they held an instrument rating. The remaining
30 (30.6%) were VFR-only pilots. It is important to note that ATP-rated pilots do
not hold instrument ratings in the way private and commercial pilot certificate
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holders do, as an add-on rating; ATP holders by default hold the privileges of an
instrument rating because their practical test is conducted under IFR. For the
purposes of this study, ATP holders are included in the count of participants with
instrument ratings.

Breakdown of Participants by Treatment Group
The participants were randomly assigned into one of four treatment groups.
The groups were W, A, WA, and N. The groups were approximately equal in size.
Table 4 shows the breakdown of participants into the treatment groups.
Table 4. Number of Participants by Condition

Condition

N

W

24

A

28

WA

21

N

25

Breakdown of Participants that Entered IMC
Of the 98 participants, 34 (35%) of them entered IMC weather conditions.
The remaining 64 (65%) participants either decided to return to KFDK or divert to
KMRB prior to entering IMC. Figure 4 shows the percentages of participants who
entered IMC at any point during the scenario video.
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35%

65%

Entered IMC

Not IMC

Figure 4. Percentage of Participants who Entered IMC

Figure 5 shows the breakdown of the pilot that entered IMC or did not,
based on certificates held by the participants. Participants were also asked if they
held an instrument rating. Over two-thirds of the participants reported that they
held instrument ratings. No question was asked regarding participants’ instrument
currency. Figure 6 shows the breakdown of the participants entering IMC by
whether they held instrument ratings. Figures 5 and 6 show that participants
entered IMC at similar rates regardless of pilot certificate level or whether they
held an instrument rating. Additionally, these rates were similar to the full sample
rate shown in Figure 4.
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Figure 5. Breakdown of Participants by Certificate Level
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Figure 6. Percent of Participants who entered IMC by Instrument Rating
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Time Spent in IMC
The first primary dependent variable was the time spent in IMC. There
were two periods during the scenario flight in which participants could fly in IMC.
If at any point in time the participant entered IMC, the duration of time that they
spent in the IMC was recorded. The first IMC period lasted 49 seconds; the second
period of IMC lasted 3 minutes and 20 seconds. The minimum time was 0 seconds
as participants did not have to enter the IMC at all. The maximum amount of time
participants could have spent in IMC, having continued to KHGR, was 4 minutes
and 9 seconds. The average amount of time participants spent in the IMC was
43.18 seconds (SD= 1.3 minutes). Figure 7 shows the progression of the scenario
from video start to video end. It shows the four stages of the scenario and includes
a brief description of the weather conditions found in each on top of a timeline that
shows how long each stage lasted.

Figure 7. Scenario Timeline and Description of Scenario Progression

Decision Response
The second primary dependent variable was the decision response. There
were three potential decision response outcomes for the flight scenarios, return to
KFDK, divert to KMRB, and continue to KHGR. An overwhelming majority
(69%) of the participants opted to return to KFDK. Table 5 shows the frequencies
of each of the decision responses that occurred.

70

Table 5. Frequencies that the Three Decision Responses Occurred

Outcome

N

%

Return to KFDK

68

69.4

Divert to KMRB

19

19.4

Continue to KHGR

11

11.2

The decision to return, divert or continue could be made at any point in the
scenario. Figure 8 shows the breakdown of when the participants made their
decisions based on the scenario timeline of when the conditions were VMC or
IMC.
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100

98

90
80

Frequency

70
60
50
40
33

30

28

23

20
28

10

5

55 10 33

0

VMC 1
0:00

3

0
IMC 1

3:55

VMC 2
4:44
Video Time (M:SS)

Return

5

2 23

Divert

Continue

7 11
IMC 2

9:30

12:30

Total

Note. The yellow line represents the number of remaining participants (had not
decided to either divert or return prior to that portion of the video). Participants
who did not opt to return or divert were categorized as continuing since they
continued to the next video portion. The remaining 11 continuing participants in
IMC 2 are the participants who continued to KHGR.
Figure 8. Number of Participants who made a Decision by Scenario Time

When looking at the visualization in Figure 8, one can tell that most of the
participants made their decisions prior to entering the first IMC condition, when the
weather was beginning to degrade. The most common decision was the decision to
return to KFDK. Overall, relatively few participants opted to divert to KMRB.
However, in the second IMC period, more participants opted to divert than
continue.
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Additional Descriptive Statistics
The settings for the scenario made the visibility two statute miles (sm) for
the first IMC period and 0 sm for the second IMC period (i.e., in the clouds). The
average IMC visibility over the course of the video was one sm. The participants,
on average, assessed the weather to be 4.32 sm with a standard deviation of 1.98
statute miles. Participants were also asked if they would act differently if they were
in an actual aircraft. Twenty-eight (29%) participants responded that they would
act differently. Fifty-eight (59%) participants responded that they would not act
differently. Twelve (12%) participants did not respond to the question.

Inferential Statistics
Primary Analysis 1- Effect of Interventions on Time in IMC
The first primary research question examined the effects that the two
interventions (graphical depictions of airspace and graphical weather depictions)
had on the amount of time pilots remained in IMC. Table 6 shows the descriptive
statistics for the time in IMC by condition.
Table 6. Descriptive Statistics for Time Participants Remained in IMC

Condition

N

M (in min.)

SD (in min.)

W

24

0.5

1.2

A

28

0.6

1.3

WA

24

1.0

1.5

N

25

0.7

1.3

Total

98

0.7

1.3

The results of the two-way ANOVA found that the main effect for graphical
depictions of airspace restrictions on time spent in IMC was not statistically
significant, F (1, 94) = 0.510, p= 0.477. The main effect for graphical depictions of
weather information on time spent in IMC was not statistically significant, F (1, 94)
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= 0.084, p= 0.773. The interaction effect was not statistically significant, F (1, 94)
= 1.366, p= 0.245.

Primary Analysis 2- Effect of Interventions on the Pilots’ Decisions
The second primary research question examined the effects of graphical depictions
of airspace restrictions and graphical depictions of weather information on pilots’
decisions to return, divert, or continue. A Chi-Square Test of Independence was
conducted and found that there were no statistically significant differences in the
decision outcome based upon which group they were assigned. The Chi-Square
test result for the airspace group was X2 (6, N = 98) = 2.64, p= .852. Table 7
shows the actual and expected counts for the Chi-Square Test.
Table 7. Actual and Expected Counts for Chi-Square Test of Independence

Outcome
Continue
Condition

A

N

W

WA

Total

Divert

Total
Return

Actual
Count

3.0

5.0

20.0

Expected
Count

3.1

5.4

19.4

Actual
Count

3.0

7.0

15.0

Expected
Count

2.8

4.8

17.3

Actual
Count

2.0

3.0

19.0

Expected
Count

2.7

4.7

16.7

Actual
Count

3.0

4.0

14.0

Expected
Count

2.4

4.1

14.6

11.0

19.0

68.0

Count

74

28.0

25.0

24.0

21.0

98.0

Exploratory Analysis 1- Multivariate Analysis of Covariance
(MANCOVA)
A two-way MANCOVA was conducted to evaluate the effects of the
graphical depictions of airspace restrictions and inflight weather information on
pilots’ decision confidence, risk perception, risk likelihood, and decision difficulty.
Pilots’ propensity towards risk was included as a covariate. At the multivariate
level risk propensity was found to be a significant covariate, F (1,74) = 5.06, p=
.001. A subsequent univariate test found that risk propensity was a significant
covariate to decision confidence, F (1, 74) = 10.46, p= .002. The multivariate test
also indicated that there were no significant main effects on any of the dependent
variables for either graphical depictions of airspace restrictions, F (1,74) = 1.52, p=
.21 or graphical depictions of weather information, F (1,74) = .85, p= .45.
However, the multivariate test did find there was a statistically significant
interaction effect between the presence of both graphical weather depictions and
graphical depictions of airspace restrictions on at least one of the dependent
variables, F (1,74) = 2.48, p= .05. At the univariate level, there was a statistically
significant interaction effect between graphical depictions of airspace restrictions
and graphical weather depictions for the dependent variable of decision confidence,
F (1,74) = 6.26, p= .015. Table 8 shows the means and standard deviations of the
decision confidence scores by condition. Figure 9 shows the interaction plot
between the two types of intervention and participants’ decision confidence scores.
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Table 8. Descriptive Statistics for Decision Confidence Scores

Conditions

M

SD

W

21.23

4.26

A

20.68

3.75

WA

22.53

2.12

N

22.38

2.06

Note. Decision confidence was measured using a five-item Likert Scale. The
scores of each item were then added up to create the final score. The possible
scores ranged from 5-25 (5 being low confidence and 25 being high confidence).
For a complete listing of the items and anchors, see Appendix C.

25.00

Decision Confidence Score

23.00

22.53

22.38

21.00
19.00

21.23

20.68

17.00
15.00
13.00
11.00
9.00
7.00
5.00

Airspace

No Airspace

Weather

No Weather

Figure 9. Interaction Plot of Decision Confidence Scores

As Figure 9 shows, participants in the condition that received both the
graphical depictions of airspace restrictions and graphical depictions of inflight
weather had the highest decision confidence scores. The control condition, which
had neither intervention, had the second-highest decision confidence scores. The
participants in the group that only received weather information had the third-
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highest decision confidence scores. The participants who only received airspace
restriction information had the lowest decision confidence scores of the four
groups.
There also was a statistically significant interaction between graphical
depictions of airspace restrictions and graphical weather depictions for decision
difficulty, F (2,75) = 4.34, p= .04. Table 9 shows the descriptive statistics for the
interaction effect of airspace information and weather information on the dependent
variable of decision difficulty. Figure 10 depicts the interaction plot for the same
relationship.

Table 9. Descriptive Statistics for Decision Difficulty

Condition

M

SD

W

2.94

1.34

A

3.16

1.26

WA

2.72

1.10

N

2.26

1.19

Note. Decision difficulty was measured on a five-item, seven-point Likert Scale.
The final score consisted of an average taken of all the items. The final scores
ranged from one to five (1 being low difficulty and 5 being high difficulty). For a
complete listing of the items and anchors, see Appendix D.
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5.00

Decision Difficulty Score

4.50
4.00
3.50

3.16

3.00
2.50

2.94
2.72

2.26

2.00
1.50
1.00
0.50
0.00
Airspace

No Airspace

Weather

No Weather

Figure 10. Interaction Plot of Decision Difficulty Scores

Figure 10 shows the interaction between graphical depictions of weather
and airspace on decision difficulty scores. The group with the highest decision
difficulty score was the airspace group. The group with the second-highest mean
decision difficulty score was the weather group. The group with the third-highest
mean decision difficulty score was the weather and airspace group. The group with
the lowest decision difficulty score was the control group.

Exploratory Analysis 2- Correlational Matrix
A correlational analysis was conducted with all the continuous quantitative
variables to find statistically significant relationships that could help explain why
35 of the participants continued to fly VFR into IMC. Some of the correlations
were seen as not relevant (e.g., it is logical that there is a relationship between age
and flight hours) and were excluded from the discussion. Table 10 presents all the
correlations that resulted from the analyses, and the most relevant relationships are
highlighted in grey and discussed in the following paragraph.
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Table 10. Correlation Matrix
Age
Age

Flight
Hours

EFB
Experience

Weather
Judgement

Decision
Confidence

Pearson
correlation
Sig. (2tailed)
N
Pearson
correlation
Sig. (2tailed)
N
Pearson
correlation
Sig. (2tailed)
N
Pearson
correlation
Sig. (2tailed)
N
Pearson
correlation
Sig. (2tailed)
N

Flight
Hours
1

98
.384**

EFB
Experience

Weather
Judgement

Decision
Confidence

Risk
Perception

Risk
Likelihood

Decision
Difficulty

IMC
Time

Risk
Propensity

.384**

.429**

-.311**

-0.068

-0.150

0.031

-0.158

0.082

0.102

0.000

0.000

0.003

0.505

0.150

0.765

0.161

0.423

0.349

97
1

97
.300**

91
-0.143

98
0.092

93
-0.184

93
0.184

80
-0.103

98
0.002

86
-0.058

0.003

0.180

0.370

0.079

0.080

0.365

0.984

0.596

96
1

90
-0.136

97
0.031

92
-.225*

92
0.079

79
-0.149

97
0.137

85
0.091

0.201

0.761

0.031

0.453

0.191

0.180

0.410

90
1

97
-0.113

92
-0.061

92
0.082

79
.256*

97
-0.109

85
0.029

0.286

0.574

0.446

0.026

0.302

0.797

91
1

88
0.175

88
-.256*

76
-.611**

91
-.256*

82
-.309**

0.093

0.013

0.000

0.011

0.004

93

93

80

98

86

0.000
97
.429**

97
.300**

0.000

0.003

97
-.311**

96
-0.143

97
-0.136

0.003

0.180

0.201

91
-0.068

90
0.092

90
0.031

91
-0.113

0.505

0.370

0.761

0.286

98

97

97

91

98

79

Age
Risk
Perception

Risk
Likelihood

Decision
Difficulty

IMC Time

Risk
Propensity

Pearson
correlation
Sig. (2tailed)
N
Pearson
correlation
Sig. (2tailed)
N
Pearson
correlation
Sig. (2tailed)
N
Pearson
correlation
Sig. (2tailed)
N
Pearson
correlation
Sig. (2tailed)
N

-0.150

Flight
Hours
-0.184

EFB
Experience
-.225*

Weather
Judgement
-0.061

Decision
Confidence
0.175

0.150

0.079

0.031

0.574

0.093

93
0.031

92
0.184

92
0.079

88
0.082

93
-.256*

93
-.634**

0.765

0.080

0.453

0.446

0.013

0.000

93
-0.158

92
-0.103

92
-0.149

88
.256*

93
-.611**

93
-0.152

93
.254*

0.161

0.365

0.191

0.026

0.000

0.178

0.023

80
0.082

79
0.002

79
0.137

76
-0.109

80
-.256*

80
-0.053

80
.206*

80
0.195

0.423

0.984

0.180

0.302

0.011

0.617

0.048

0.083

98
0.102

97
-0.058

97
0.091

91
0.029

98
-.309**

93
-.225*

93
.405**

80
0.079

98
0.120

0.349

0.596

0.410

0.797

0.004

0.037

0.000

0.489

0.271

86

85

85

82

86

86

86

79

86

Note. * p < .05. ** p < .01.

80

Risk
Perception
1

Risk
Likelihood
-.634**

Decision
Difficulty
-0.152

IMC
Time
-0.053

Risk
Propensity
-.225*

0.000

0.178

0.617

0.037

93
1

80
.254*

93
.206*

86
.405**

0.023

0.048

0.000

80
1

93
0.195

86
0.079

0.083

0.489

80
1

79
0.120
0.271
86
1

86

There is a moderate negative correlation between age and weather
judgement r (89) = -.311, p = .003. Younger pilots have a higher estimate of flight
visibility than older pilots. EFB experience has a negative correlation with risk
perception r (90) = -.225, p = .031. In this relationship, the more experience pilots
have with utilizing EFBs, the lower their risk perception. Two variables are
correlated with time in IMC, risk likelihood (the likelihood they would take a
specific risk), r (91) =.206, p=.041, and decision confidence, r (96)= -.256,
p=.011. In the relationship between risk likelihood and time in IMC, the higher a
pilot’s risk likelihood, the more likely they are to spend time in IMC. The
relationship between decision confidence and time in IMC indicates that the higher
the pilots’ decision confidence, the less likely they are to fly into IMC. There is a
moderate correlation between risk propensity and risk likelihood, r (86) = .405, p=
< 0.01. In this relationship, the higher the participant’s risk propensity (orientation
towards risk), the more likely they are to take the risk.

Thematic Analysis
Qualitative data was collected to provide insights into participants’
decision-making processes as they decided to return to KFDK, divert to KMRB, or
continue to KHGR. The purpose of collecting qualitative data was to identify the
factors that contributed to their ultimate decision. The participants were asked,
“What factors contributed to your decision to continue, divert, or return to the
departure airport?” Table 11 shows the themes and frequencies of various factors
that participants cited that influenced their decisions.
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Table 11. Thematic Analysis of Factors that Contributed to Decision Made

# of Participants who made Each
Decision
Total
Entered IMC
Factors that Contributed
to Decision

Return

Divert

Continue

68

19

11

13 (19%)

9 (47%)

11 (100%)

# Of Participants who Selected Each Factor

Visibility/Cloud Clearance

42

5

2

Deteriorating Conditions

24

3

0

Safety of Flight

13

2

0

Inoperative Equipment

12

1

0

Would take a different course
if able*

5

1

2

Maintaining altitude issues

2

1

0

Assessed the weather as still
VMC

2

2

1

Possible VFR into IMC

1

2

0

Accuracy of Forecast

1

0

1

Other**

8

2

3

Note. * Participants were limited to either returning, diverting, or continuing.
They were not permitted to change course or deviate from altitude. However,
many participants expressed that they would have tried those before taking one of
the three choices. ** Comments categorized in other were responses to the
question that were either not meaningful or not relevant.

Among the participants who made the decision to return to KFDK, 13 of
them entered IMC, and the remaining 55 of them remained in VMC, indicating that
participants who opted to return were more likely to make that decision prior to
entering IMC. The thematic analysis found that the most cited factor that
influenced participants to decide to return to KFDK (the airport of departure) was
the visibility and ceiling. This factor was cited by 42 individuals. The second most
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cited factor was deteriorating weather conditions, which was cited by 24
participants. For the purposes of this analysis, a distinction was made between
ceiling and visibility. Visibility was defined as the height of the cloud
bases/straight line visibility in sm. Deteriorating weather was defined as weather
conditions worsening in terms of weather such as precipitation or convective
activity. Other commonly cited influencing factors were safety of flight which was
cited by 13 participants, and inoperative equipment, which was cited as a factor by
12 participants.
The participants who opted to divert to KMRB split nearly equally among
whether they entered IMC or remained in VMC. Of the 19 participants who
decided to divert to KMRB, nine of the participants entered the IMC, while 10 of
the participants remained in VMC. The most common factor in deciding whether
diverted was ceiling and visibility, which was cited by five participants. The
second most cited factor was deteriorating weather conditions which was cited by
three participants.
All of the participants who continued to KHGR entered the IMC. The most
cited factor in continuing was the visibility and ceiling being perceived as within
limits for VFR flight, which was cited by three individuals. The second most-cited
factor was that they would have taken a different course if able, cited by two
individuals—one of the participants who continued stated that they would have
descended to better clear the clouds.
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Chapter 5: Discussion
Research Summary
The purpose of this study was to examine the effects that two common
forms of cockpit information displayed on an EFB have on pilots’ decisions to
continue flight into IMC and the ultimate decision outcome. The displayed
information includes the graphical depiction of airspace restrictions (specifically
TFRs) and the graphical depiction of weather information. The participants were
divided into four groups one that received just a graphical depiction of weather
information, one that received just a graphical depiction of airspace restrictions,
one that received both, and one that received neither (control). The participants
watched an interactive video depicting a scenario in which they monitored the
aircraft as if in flight. Within the scenario, the weather conditions deteriorated to
IMC, and when they felt like they should either return or divert, they clicked the
appropriate button. For this study, the participants had three options: return to
KFDK, divert to KMRB, and continue to KHGR. After watching the video and
indicating their decision response, the participants were asked to answer a brief
survey which formed the basis of the exploratory quantitative and qualitative
analyses.
One of the most interesting findings of this study was that 35% of the
participants entered the IMC during the scenario. This finding is interesting
because the participants were all informed that the aircraft’s attitude indicator was
inoperative. The attitude indicator being inoperative was chosen as an attribute of
the scenario because the attitude indicator is a required piece of equipment for IFR
flight under 14 CFR Part 91 § 205. Additionally, the attitude indicator is one of the
most used instruments in IFR flying. Although it would be reasonable to expect
that some participants would enter the IMC, it was interesting to see that over onethird of the participants entered it, violating the Federal Aviation Regulations.
Interestingly, the percentage of participants who entered the IMC was identical to
the percentage of participants who entered the IMC in a study conducted by Hunter
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et al. (2011). The fact that the percentages of participants who entered the IMC
were equal between this study and the Hunter et al. (2011) study indicates that
despite advances in technology and public awareness campaigns by government
agencies and industry groups over the past decade to reduce VFR flight into IMC, it
appears that pilots are flying into IMC at a similar rate and those interventions are
not working. This finding also highlights the importance of this area of research
and the need for this present study.
The participants were asked to state their level of pilot certificate, so
potential trends in whether participants entered IMC differed based on their
certificate level. Due to the disparities in the numbers of participants that held each
level of certificate, statistical tests such as ANOVAs were not appropriate and only
trends can be inferred. It is reasonable to expect that as pilots gain experience, they
would be less likely to enter IMC; however, as Figure 5 shows, there are no
noticeable differences in the percentages of pilots who entered IMC based on their
certificate level. Private pilots and commercial pilots entered the IMC at nearly
identical rates. Airline transport pilots (ATP) entered IMC at slightly higher rates.
However, it is important to note that only 10 of the participants held ATP
certificates, and with such a small sample size, the percentages can be inflated.
This finding is important because it shows that VFR into IMC is a universal
phenomenon and does not appear to decrease with the further training that is
required to obtain advanced ratings.
When the participants were divided by whether they possessed an
instrument rating or not, the percentage of participants who entered the IMC was
nearly identical. Figure 6 shows that 43% of participants who held an instrument
rating entered the IMC and that 47% of the participants who did not hold an
instrument rating entered the IMC. This finding indicates that simply having an
instrument rating does not appear to affect whether participants entered the IMC.
This finding makes sense because, in the experimental scenario, the correct course
of action is the same regardless of whether the pilot is instrument rated because the
aircraft is not legal for IFR flight.
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On average, participants rated that the visibility was 4.32-sm. In actuality,
at the beginning of the scenario, the visibility was 5-sm, but then in the IMC
portions of the video, the visibility dropped down to 1-2 sm. The finding that
participants overestimated the flight visibility aligned with both Ahlstrom et al.
(2019) and Wiegmann et al. (2002), which found that many participants
overestimated the weather conditions. A potential theoretical explanation for this
is anchoring bias. Anchoring bias refers to the cognitive bias where individuals
lock onto the first piece of information they get (Wickens et al., 2004). In this
scenario, the participants were provided with an intentionally faulty weather
briefing that depicted the weather as suitable for VFR flight when in reality, the
weather was going to deteriorate to IMC. Another potential theoretical explanation
is overconfidence bias, where participants overestimate their level of knowledge or
ability. Participants could be overestimating their ability to judge flight visibility.
Understanding that the participants overestimated the weather is important because
that could serve to indicate that the participants who entered IMC might be simply
overestimating the conditions and continuing into what they assess to be suitable
weather conditions.
Understanding that 35% of the participants entered IMC and that there are
no trends that indicate differences in whether participants entered the IMC based
upon certificate level or holding an instrument rating is important in understanding
the big picture context around VFR flight into IMC. Because over a third of the
participants entered the IMC, it shows that VFR into IMC is a current and pressing
hazard to general aviation safety; it also shows that existing methods of trying to
reduce its frequency are not working. Since the Hunter et al. (2011) study, which
found a similar result in the percentage of pilots that entered IMC, EFBs, and
portable cockpit inflight weather has become commonplace, one could hypothesize
that if pilots had more weather information at their disposal, they would be aware
of degrading conditions and attempt to avoid it. However, this is not what the data
suggests. The data suggests that despite advances in technology, pilots fly into
IMC at a similar rate which could very well lead to another hypothesis that the
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presence of inflight weather information could lead to pilots using it to persist
longer in inclement weather. This was the nature of the present study’s hypothesis.
The findings that there do not appear to be any differences in whether participants
enter IMC based on certificate level and instrument rating status indicate that other
factors influence whether participants entered the IMC.
The remainder of this discussion section discusses the various relationships
found from the results of this study and the factors identified from the qualitative
analyses. The section discusses potential explanations of these relationships and
factors to help increase the understanding of VFR flight into IMC situations. This
section continues on with recommendations for future research and
recommendations for the aviation industry to take action in a way that could
potentially decrease VFR into IMC accidents.

Impact of Weather and Airspace Information Presentation on
Decision Making
The first primary research question was “what effect does the presence of
graphical weather information on the EFB moving map have on pilots’ decision to
continue VFR flight into IMC as measured by (a) time spent in IMC and (b) pilot
decision response?” The results indicated that there were no statistically significant
main effects of the presence of graphical depictions of weather information on
either time spent in IMC. The results also indicated that there are no significant
effects on decision response. This led to the failure to reject the null hypothesis
that there were no significant differences in time in IMC or decision response based
on condition.
The second primary research question was “what effect does the presence
of graphical depictions of airspace restrictions moving map have on pilots’ decision
to continue VFR flight into IMC as measured by (a) time spent in IMC and (b) pilot
decision to continue, divert or return to the departure airport.” Like the first
research question, there were no significant effects of the presence of graphical
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depictions of airspace restrictions on time spent in IMC and the pilot decision. This
led to the failure to reject the null hypothesis.
Additionally, there were no significant interaction effects between graphical
depictions of airspace restrictions and graphical weather information on either time
in IMC or pilot decision response. This means that neither of the interventions
appeared to significantly impact the time participants spent in IMC and the
participants’ decision outcome.
The exploratory research questions were designed to examine the
relationship between decision confidence, decision difficulty, risk perception, risk
propensity, risk likelihood, and IMC time. The first exploratory analysis examined
the effects of the interventions on decision confidence, decision difficulty, risk
perception, and risk likelihood. In this analysis, risk propensity was a covariate.
Risk propensity was included as a covariate because while decision confidence,
decision difficulty, risk perception, and risk likelihood were all measured responses
to the scenario, risk propensity is an individual difference that could potentially
confound the results. The results of this analysis found risk propensity to be a
significant covariate, meaning that risk propensity was a confounding variable that
significantly influenced the participants’ responses to the interventions presented to
them in the scenario. Further, there was a significant interaction between graphical
depictions of airspace restrictions and graphical depictions of weather information
on decision confidence and decision difficulty. This indicates that both decision
confidence and decision difficulty scores operated differently based on the presence
of the interventions. In other words, the decision confidence and decision difficulty
scores depended on the treatment condition the participants received.
Correlations were then conducted to identify significant relationships
between all of the relevant variables measured. The correlations were conducted in
order to find any relationships that could potentially help explain the results of the
primary analyses. Only two of the correlations were found to have a significant
relationship with time in IMC; those correlations were decision confidence and risk
likelihood. Other relevant significant correlations included age and weather
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judgment, EFB experience and risk perception, and risk propensity and risk
likelihood. No analysis was conducted on the five exploratory variables and the
decision outcomes because the number of participants in each outcome group was
not equal. An ANOVA is not robust enough for the large differences in group size
(e.g., 68 in return and 10 in continue) and, therefore, would not be appropriate.

Theoretical Discussion
Participants who Entered IMC
Many of the findings were aligned with previous research conducted
regarding VFR into IMC situations. The finding that 35% of participants continued
flying VFR into IMC despite flying an aircraft they knew had inoperative
equipment and was not IFR capable aligns with previous research. Johnson and
Wiegmann (2015) found that 56% of pilots in their study continued into the IMC
conditions and that 26% continued to the destination with IMC prevailing. Eleven
percent of the participants in the present study continued to the destination with
IMC prevailing. It is essential to note that the present study had a larger sample
size than the Johnson and Wiegmann (2015) study, and the smaller sample size
could have inflated the percentage. Hunter et al. (2011) found that approximately
32% of participants flew into adverse weather intentionally despite not being
qualified to do so. Given these studies’ results, it makes sense that the current
study found that a large proportion of participants entered IMC.
Ison et al. (2014) found that as certificate level increased, the frequency of
VFR into IMC decreased. Due to the relevantly few participants who had higher
level certificates in the present study, it was impossible to conduct a statistical
analysis to see if there were statistically significant differences in the number of
participants who entered IMC at the higher certificate levels. The breakdown of the
number entering IMC by whether they had an instrument rating aligns with
previous research. Hunter et al. (2011) found that more instrument-rated pilots did
not enter adverse weather than non-instrument-rated pilots. In the current study,
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looking at the percentages of participants with and without instrument ratings that
continued flying into the IMC, that trend did not hold. Based on Figure 6, it
appears that approximately an equal number of instrument-rated pilots entered IMC
than non-instrument-rated pilots. A potential explanation for this is that while
instrument-rated pilots recognize the risk and added complexity of flying in IMC,
they still struggle to identify when the weather has dropped below VFR minimums.
This indicates that more training is required of general aviation pilots regarding
weather.

Relationship between Interventions and IMC Time
The finding of a lack of significance in the relationship between the
graphical depictions of airspace restrictions and weather information and time spent
in IMC aligns with some previous studies and conflicts with other studies. A study
by Whitehurst (2019) found that interventions to reduce VFR flight into IMC were
not effective and that more information does not affect pilots’ time flown in IMC.
The research hypothesis of this study was that pilots would utilize the advanced
features of the EFB to continue into adverse weather, similar to the findings of
Wiggins (2007) with GPS. This hypothesis was not supported, and the two
interventions did not appear to affect the time participants spent in IMC.
However, a study by Ahlstrom et al. (2016) found that pilots who used a portable
inflight weather application took greater action to avoid inclement weather by
deviating from the planned course or diverting. Deviating from the planned course
was not an option for participants in the current study due to limitations in the
testbed and a desire to force participants to make a definitive decision. Based on
the results of the Ahlstrom et al. (2016) study, it would be expected that there
would be differences in the amount of time spent in IMC based on the amount of
information participants were given in each of the conditions. Additionally, a study
by Wiggins (2007) found that pilots who fly with moving map GPS display are
more likely to approach inclement weather.
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There are multiple potential explanations for why the interventions did not
significantly affect the time participants spent flying in IMC. The first potential
explanation is that pilots would not use the graphical depictions of airspace or
graphical weather depictions in a manner that enables them to persist in
deteriorating weather conditions. Pilots are trained to make a 180-degree turn and
fly back out where they came if they enter inclement weather while operating under
VFR. There is a possibility that pilots could be relying on their training. This
would be supported by the data that shows that most of the participants opted to
return to the departure airport in the first VMC condition before entering the first
region of IMC.
A second potential explanation is that attributes of the study’s design
prevented the participants from responding how they would have in an actual
aircraft. There are two possible attributes of the study that could have contributed
to this. The first is that the study used a low fidelity simulation. Multiple
participants expressed in the additional comments field that the low fidelity made it
difficult to judge the visibility and cloud clearance. Because the visibility was
difficult to judge, participants may have been more conservative in their decisions
to turn back than they would be in an actual cockpit. The second attribute is that
many participants participated in the study on smartphones. Reading the flight
instruments in the simulated cockpit would have been difficult to impossible with
the small screen size. This meant that the participants would not have received
airspeed, altitude, and heading information. Participants who lacked that
information were making a decision in a scenario that lacked realism. A third
possible explanation would be social desirability bias; as weather conditions
degraded, participants may have opted to turn around because they felt that option
was most socially acceptable. In the current study, continuing into IMC is illegal
due to the inoperative equipment; participants may have opted to return even if they
would not have in real life because they did not want to admit to violating
regulations. An extension of this is the Hawthorne Effect, which is the idea that
participants work extra hard to perform better because they know that they are in a
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study. In the current study, participants may have opted to turn around as soon as
they saw the weather degrade because they figured out that the study was
examining VFR flight into IMC, and they wanted to avoid entering IMC.

Relationship between Interventions and Decision Outcome
The finding that the two interventions had no significant relationship with
decision outcome did not align with prior research. Regarding the presence of
graphical depictions of weather information, Ahlstrom et al. (2016) found that
participants who utilized a mobile inflight-weather application were more likely to
divert when faced with inclement weather than participants who did not use mobile
weather applications. In the current study, no such finding occurred. Since there
was a lack of significance, it can be concluded that participants’ decisions were due
to factors other than the independent variables. A potential explanation could be
that the decision outcome could be linked to the stage of the flight (e.g., diverting
made sense if they were closer to KMRB than KFDK). The proportional counts of
the decisions would support this explanation. That explanation would also align
with Batt and O’Hare’s (2005) findings, which found that pilots who
diverted/entered the IMC were more likely to do it in the latter half of the flight as
opposed to avoidance action such as returning to the departure airport.

Relationship Between Interventions and Decision Confidence
There was a statistically significant interaction between graphical depictions
of airspace restrictions and graphical inflight weather for decision confidence. The
interaction showed that participants who received both the weather information and
the airspace restriction information had the highest decision confidence scores.
That finding is logical because the participants who have the most information will
make the most educated decision. The ADM models created by Orasanu and
Fischer (1997) and Bell and Mauro (2000) explain that the more information a
decision makes, the more confident they tend to be in the decision.
Interestingly, the second highest mean decision confidence score came from
the control group. The control group got neither intervention. A potential
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explanation for this finding is the concept of the “unknown unknowns (Fadun,
2013).” There is a concept of known unknowns and unknown unknowns in risk
measurement (typically used in business or defense sectors). Known unknowns are
risks that are known, but the extent of the risk is unknown. For example, if a pilot
knows that there is bad weather up ahead but cannot see exactly where it is, that
would be a known unknown.
On the other hand, unknown unknowns refer to “categories of risks or
events that are totally outside the scope of most scenarios (Fadun, 2013, p. 231).”
In the context of the findings, the participants in the control group did not know the
location of the flight restriction and had no knowledge of the inclement weather
beyond what they saw out the window. Because of this, the control group
participants did not know the risk posed by the increasing unforecasted convection
and precipitation. As such, they were making decisions based on the incorrect
information from the preflight briefing and their views out the window. Because
they did not know the true risk the scenario posed to safety, the participants in the
control group may have felt the situation was less risky than it was and felt more
confident in their abilities.
Another possible explanation would be the Dunning-Kruger effect. The
Dunning-Kruger effect is a cognitive bias where individuals lacking knowledge or
competence overstate their abilities (Kruger & Dunning, 1999). In this case, it is
not that the participants are incompetent pilots rather that they lacked the
knowledge to make the correct decision due to the lack of information in the
control group. As Dunning et al. (2004) state, as cited in Nunley and ShermanMorris (2019) that “people are not adept at spotting the limits of their knowledge
and expertise and are ‘blissfully unaware of their incompetence’ p. 1227).” Like
Fadun’s (2013) unknown unknowns, the participants were unaware of any missing
information, assumed they had a complete picture and overstated their confidence
in the decision.
The remaining two conditions were the airspace only and the weather only
conditions. Both conditions only had one of the interventions. Participants in these
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conditions had the lowest levels of confidence in their decisions. A plausible
explanation for this is that the participants only had half of the information, and
they knew that there were known unknowns. The participants in the airspace
restriction group knew exactly where the airspace restrictions were but knew that
they did not know the weather status and vice versa for the weather information
group. Because the participants in those groups were aware they had missing
information to make their decision upon, they had more doubt about whether their
decision was correct. Dequech (1999) explains that the greater the uncertainty, the
lower the confidence when making decisions under uncertainty.

Relationship Between Interventions and Decision Difficulty
There was also a significant interaction effect between airspace restrictions
and graphical depictions of weather for decision difficulty ratings. As shown in
Figure 10, this interaction was almost a complete inverse of the interaction between
the two intervention variables and decision confidence. This result makes sense
because there is a strong negative correlation between decision confidence and
decision difficulty, as indicated by our results. The higher the perceived difficulty
of the decision, the lower the participant’s confidence in their decision.
The highest mean difficulty scores were among the participants who were
only exposed to the airspace group. The most likely reason for this being the
highest score is that the airspace restriction provides the least useful information
when deciding whether to continue, divert, or return. The second highest mean
difficulty scores were for the participants who were exposed to only the weather
information. A plausible explanation for why this was lower than the airspace
group was that while it still gave partial information, the information the weather
display gave was more useful to the participants making the decision because
ultimately, the participants had to decide which action to take based on the weather.
While the airspace restriction display served as a useful aid to situational
awareness, the decision to return, divert or continue the VFR flight is based on the
weather. The TFR in this scenario was away from the route of flight, and the
planned route of flight avoided it completely. The second-least difficulty score was
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the control group. A potential explanation for this finding is the same reason the
control group had the second-highest confidence score. The participants were
unaware that they were missing information relevant to making the decision; they
overestimated their knowledge about the situation and then rated the decision as
less difficult. This phenomenon is similar to how a student could find a test
extremely easy but fail it. In this example, because the student was unaware that
they lacked the knowledge to complete the test, they perceived it to be easy. The
lowest mean decision difficulty score was the group that got both weather and
airspace information. The explanation for why the group that received neither
treatment had the lowest decision difficulty scores is the same as for why that
group had the highest mean confidence score. That explanation was that the
participants were possibly experiencing the Dunning-Kruger effect, which states
that individuals lacking knowledge or competence tend to overstate their abilities.
In this case, it had less to do with incompetence and more to do with a lack of
knowledge. Because the participants in the control group had no added information
beyond the preflight briefing and the view out the window, they had no idea of the
full extent of the weather situation and, as such, found the decision easier. This
idea is in line with research conducted by Chen and Li (2015) into decision making
with conflicting information that found that decisions made with missing
information were made in a similar amount of time and elicited a similar response
to decisions made with congruent information. This finding could explain why
making a decision having no information was perceived as easier than making the
same decision with partial information

Risk Propensity as a Covariate
Risk propensity refers to an individual’s tendency to see or avoid risk. Risk
propensity was found to be a statistically significant covariate in the interaction
between graphical depictions of airspace restrictions and graphical depictions of
weather information. Covariates are variables other than the independent variables
that could influence the outcome. A potential explanation for risk propensity as a
significant covariate is that some people are inherently riskier by nature. If two
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individuals have different levels of risk propensity, they would likely assess the
same situation in different ways. Given that people assess the situation differently,
it would be logical that they act differently when confronted with a risky situation.
A person with a lower risk propensity might decide to turn back sooner regardless
of the intervention. In contrast, a person with a higher risk propensity might
continue for longer regardless of the intervention. This is how risk propensity
could conceivably impact the dependent variables of decision difficulty and
decision confidence. Risk propensity was included as a covariate to account for
these individual differences.

Variable Correlations
A study by Whitehurst et al. (2019) found that age and experience in flight
hours were not significantly related to whether they entered or how long
participants remained in IMC. My study found the same result that neither age nor
flight hours were correlated with the amount of time spent in IMC. Additionally,
age was not found to affect the decision outcome (return, divert, or continue). Age,
however, was found to be significantly negatively correlated with participants’
estimate of visibility. A potential explanation for this is that older pilots have more
experience judging the weather and, as such, have a better judgment of the weather.
This explanation is supported by the finding that age is significantly correlated with
experience. Another possible explanation is that younger pilots may overestimate
their ability to judge the weather. The fact that some pilots may overestimate their
ability to judge the weather aligns with the findings of Ahlstrom et al. (2019) and
Weigmann (2002). However, neither Ahlstrom et al. (2019) nor Wiegmann (2002)
examined it from the perspective of age.
A potential explanation for the negative relationship between risk
perception and EFB use is familiarity. The more familiar an individual is with the
systems they are using, it would be logical to conclude that they perceive the risk to
be lower. A potential explanation for why there is a negative correlation between
decision confidence and time in IMC is that participants who entered the IMC
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could realize that they made a mistake, resulting in their confidence in their
decision as lower.
There was a significant negative correlation between decision confidence
and time in IMC. A potential explanation for this finding was that participants who
entered the IMC realized they had made a mistake and were in a bad decision, so
the longer they were in the IMC, the lower their confidence in their decision. The
Walmsley and Gilbey (2016) study found that participants rated the decision as
better if it resulted in a positive outcome. Because the participants knew that
entering IMC was illegal, that was a bad outcome, and as such, their confidence
that the decision was correct may have been lower.

Thematic Analysis
The thematic analysis found that participants who decided to return to
KFDK most commonly cited poor visibility/cloud clearance. The fact that poor
visibility/cloud clearance was the most cited factor that led to participants deciding
to return indicates that many of the participants judged that the weather was too
poor for sustained VFR flight. This finding was like the findings of Gallo et al.
(2015)’s qualitative analysis of actual VFR into IMC survivors. In that study, the
participants who decided to divert or turn around most frequently cited the
deteriorating weather. In the present study, deteriorating weather was the second
most cited factor contributing to participants’ decision to return to the departure
airport. For this analysis, deteriorating weather meant that the weather conditions
were actively degrading throughout the flight. The fact that 24 participants cited
that the weather conditions were deteriorating throughout the scenario indicated
that they were paying close enough attention to the weather to notice the conditions
changing. A couple of participants expressed that the conditions were the
beginning of a VFR flight into IMC situation. These comments were interesting
because they meant that the participants who pointed out that the conditions were
the beginning of a VFR into IMC situation were aware of the hazard VFR flight
into IMC poses. When they recognized the “red flags,” they opted to turn around.
Thirteen participants expressed that they felt the safety of flight was jeopardized by
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continuing into the inclement weather. Some participants made statements like “It
was not worth the risk” and “I knew the conditions on the way back.” These
comments indicate that participants were able to detect the growing hazard of the
weather conditions in the scenario and assessed that the risk was too great to be
worth it.
Among the participants who decided to divert to KMRB, the most cited
factor was visibility/cloud clearance, which five participants cited as a factor. The
second most cited factor was deteriorating weather conditions which was cited as a
factor by three participants. Interestingly, these were both the top two factors
among the participants who decided to return to KFDK. A potential explanation
for this is that both the participants who decided to return to KFDK and divert to
KMRB felt that the weather was too dangerous to continue, however as Figure 8
shows, many of the participants who diverted decided to do so later in the flight as
nine (47%) of the participants who diverted decided to do so in the VMC 2 and
IMC 2 stages of scenario. In these stages of the scenario, KMRB was closer than
KFDK, so if the participants wanted to land as soon as possible, it would make
sense to divert to KMRB. Interestingly, 10 (53%) of the participants decided to
divert in VMC 1. VMC 1 is the first stage of the scenario, and it occurred before
the weather conditions went IMC. Additionally, when the participant is still in
VMC 1, returning to KFDK is quicker than diverting to KMRB. It is also
interesting to note that participants who decided to divert during VMC would
actually have to fly through the IMC to reach KMRB. Knowing all these details, it
would appear that participants were making an irrational choice. However, a
potential explanation for this is that participants were bad at judging the weather
and knew that the conditions were not good enough to make it to KHGR but felt
that the weather was good enough to make it to KMRB. Previous research by
Weigmann et al. (2002) found that only one-third of pilots were able to accurately
estimate weather conditions and that 27% of them overestimated the conditions.
Ahlstrom et al. (2016) found that pilots who just guessed the weather made errors
twice more often than if they used a decision-making heuristic.
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In the present study, 11 participants continued to KHGR by flying in IMC.
This finding was interesting because the Gallo et al. (2015) study, which conducted
a qualitative analysis of pilots who inadvertently entered IMC in real life, found
that none of the participants attempted to continue to fly through inclement
weather. In the Gallo et al. (2015) study, the participants all took action to exit the
inclement weather as fast as possible. They cited that they assessed the weather to
be suitable for VFR flight. This finding is interesting because it indicates that the
participants who continued to KHGR truly felt the weather was suitable and were
not intentionally flying illegally. Another interesting finding from the participants
who continued to KHGR was that one of the participants expressed that they
trusted that the weather conditions were suitable because the weather report said the
weather was above VFR minimums. This indicates that, at the very least, this pilot
had succumbed to the anchoring bias. The anchoring bias is a cognitive bias where
decision-makers make all of their decisions based on the first piece of information
they receive and weigh that first piece of information as more important than
subsequent information (Wickens et al., 2004). In the current study, the anchoring
bias could manifest as a pilot making decisions based on the preflight weather
briefing and missing the degrading weather. Burgens et al. (2002), as cited in
Wickens et al., (2004), says that for reasons unknown, “information that is
processed early is often the most influential, and this will ultimately affect decision
making (p. 165).”

Practical Discussion
Based on a thorough review of the literature, it was found that no prior
study had been conducted on the effects of advanced information such as weather
radar information and graphical depictions of airspace restrictions (such as TFRs)
on pilots’ decisions to continue flight in adverse weather. This is even though
general aviation pilots have been widely using EFBs for over a decade (ForeFlight,
2021). Further, since the introduction of iPad-based EFB applications targeted
towards general aviation pilots, the available features have increased dramatically.

99

If pilots were using their EFB applications to persist in adverse weather conditions,
that would indicate a significant latent safety issue throughout general aviation.
The fact that no studies have explored this indicates a large gap in our
understanding of general aviation pilots’ decision-making process. The results of
this study have many practical implications. The first practical implication is that
the interventions did not influence how long participants remained in IMC. This
finding suggests that no latent safety issue exists of pilots relying on their
technology to persist into inclement weather. However, there is the chance that
attributes of the study design may have prevented the discovery of any possible
effects. Additionally, the finding that the interventions did not affect which
decision alternative that participants chose suggests that the participants were most
likely making their decisions based on the outside visual cues per their training.
A second practical implication of the study was the finding that 35% of the
participants entered the IMC despite knowing that the aircraft was not legal for IFR
flight due to inoperative equipment. This finding, which is aligned with previous
research conducted on the topic of VFR into IMC flight, indicates that there is still
a significant problem of pilots’ willingness to enter adverse weather. Hunter
(2011) found that 32% of pilots would intentionally enter IMC a full decade before
this study was conducted. Despite advances in technology over the past ten years,
pilots are still entering adverse weather and being killed at nearly the same rate as
before. The results indicate that current methods of trying to address the problem
are not working. The results indicate that the solution to the VFR into IMC
problem is probably training-based versus technology-based. This is because
despite providing a graphical depiction of inclement weather, pilots still flew into
the IMC. The finding also indicates that more research needs to be conducted and
new interventions to address the issue explored.
The thematic analysis found that many of the participants who continued to
KHGR assessed that the weather was still VFR, and they were still legal to fly.
Many of the pilots who returned to KFDK, and did so prior to entering the IMC,
assessed that the weather was deteriorating or that the ceilings/visibility were not
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suitable for VFR flight. Many of the participants who returned expressed that
continuing was not worth the risk. One participant stated that “[I took] one look at
clouds ahead said this isn’t worth continuing.” Another participant stated that
“Ultimately, the flight wasn’t worth the risk of getting stuck in lowering ceilings.”
The thematic analysis and the qualitative data paint a picture that it is most likely
not intentional despite 35% of the participants entering IMC. The pilots who opted
to continue to KHGR made statements like, “clear of clouds, the forecast looked
favorable, request VFR flight following then special VFR,” and “ability to maintain
contact with the ground.” Special VFR is an approval that pilots can get from ATC
to land in less than VFR conditions, but they can remain clear of the clouds (FAA,
2021). However, it is important to note that special VFR is only available within
the controlled airspace surrounding an airport. It is unknown if that participant
expressed that they would get a special VFR clearance if necessary to land in
KHGR or if the pilot was mistakenly under the impression that they could get a
special VFR clearance away from the airport. The ability to maintain contact with
the ground could refer to that participant’s misconception that just seeing the
ground provides an ability to fly VFR legally. However, in Class E airspace
(where a majority of the flight from KFDK to KHGR is occurring), VFR flight
requires three statute miles of flight visibility.
The study provided a qualitative look into why modern general aviation
pilots continue to enter IMC while operating under VFR inadvertently. These
results provide an increased understanding of the key factors pilots view when
deciding to return, divert, or continue. The key factors include but are not limited
to the pilots’ assessment of the visibility, whether the pilot perceived the conditions
to be deteriorating, the presence of inoperative equipment (i.e., the attitude
indicator being inoperative), and the safety of flight. Based upon these results, it
can be inferred that many VFR into IMC situations are accidental and quite likely
due to incorrect assessment of the weather conditions. They also indicate that more
weather-related instruction may be required in aviation training curricula. This
conclusion aligns with the literature and industry guidance (Blickensderfer et al.,
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2017; NTSB, 2017). In fact, the NTSB has issued multiple safety
recommendations that call for changes to training curricula for adverse weather
avoidance and spatial disorientation awareness. Many of the recommendations
were issued to commercial operators and not for recreational pilots. However, the
flying task is the same whether the aircraft is being operated for hire or for
recreation.
A third practical implication is that many of the advanced features of the
EFB do enhance the ADM process. There was a statistically significant interaction
between the presence of graphical weather information and graphical depictions of
airspace restrictions on decision confidence and decision difficulty. The
participants who had both treatments had higher levels of confidence in their
decisions and found that the process of making the decisions was easier. These
findings suggest that more advanced EFB features facilitate aeronautical decisionmaking, and pilots who are using EFBs are making more informed decisions.
However, EFB application designers need to ensure that they provide appropriate
amounts of information as too much information can result in decreased
performance (Moachdieh et al., 2013). However, based on the findings, it is logical
to conclude that having access to graphical depictions of airspace restrictions and
weather is beneficial to pilot decision-making.

Limitations
The primary limitation of the study was that it utilized a low-fidelity
simulation. Multiple participants expressed that the low fidelity of the simulation
made it hard to determine if the weather was still VMC or IMC. Participants
expressed that the low fidelity of the simulation made it difficult to judge the
weather accurately. Participants also expressed that they did not like that the route
could not be changed, and they could not change altitude and descend away from
the clouds. These two aspects were limitations of the testbed because the testbed
used a pre-recorded video that was made interactive. Because participants were
limited in the number of options they could take, there were potential courses of
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action that pilots would have taken, and they had to choose the best approximate
choice. In the real world, aeronautical decisions are not trichotomous; the number
of options is nearly endless, and a pilot might do a combination of maneuvers. For
example, descending, slowing down, and turning around. Additionally, many
individuals participated in the study on smartphones; due to the small screen size,
participants may not have been able to clearly read the instruments on the
instrument panel, reducing the scenario’s fidelity.
A second limitation was that due to a display error on Qualtrics, the
decision difficulty questions sometimes did not appear properly on some mobile
devices. This was an issue that did not arise in pilot testing or could be replicated
when identified. This issue only occurred on this one series of questions and
resulted in partial data for some participants. The participants where partial data
existed were excluded from analyses that involved decision difficulty.
A third limitation was that while including risk propensity as a covariate
controls for its effects, because one of the primary DV’s was categorical, it was not
able to be accounted for in the Chi-Square Analysis of the effects of the
interventions on decision outcome. In other words, I was able to control for
confounding effects of risk propensity on the exploratory analyses but not on the
analysis of decision outcome.
A fourth limitation was that the layout of the buttons within the interactive
video interface may have caused participants to respond differently than they would
have in real life. The participants were presented with two clickable buttons, one
that said “Return to KFDK” the other that side “Divert to KMRB” there was no
button for continuing as that was a no action condition. However, because of the
availability of the other two buttons, participants may have been more likely to
choose one of them. One participant expressed that they did not know that
continuing was even an option, even though they would have returned anyway.
Additionally, the return button is the first button in the sequence, and participants
may have chosen that because it was presented first.
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Further Research
There are multiple areas of further research that can be pursued based on the
findings of the study. The first is to conduct a follow-up study to examine the
cause of the high standard deviation that may have washed out the effects of the
interventions on IMC Time. The descriptive statistics show noticeable differences
between the groups; however, there were incredibly large standard deviations. The
large standard deviations indicate that there were likely other factors involved that
were more influential than the interventions. It is unclear whether the standard
deviations were large due to limitations of how the study was conducted. One of
the study’s limitations was that the scenarios were low fidelity, and some
participants had trouble identifying the weather conditions. This was expressed
when the participants were asked if they had any additional comments. There is a
chance that the high variation in IMC times could have been caused by participants
taking a guess. It would be interesting to see if the results were the same in a highfidelity simulator.
The second area of further research would be examining the factors that
contribute to pilots continuing VFR flight into IMC. The thematic analysis
identified various factors that influenced participants’ decisions to return to the
departure airport, divert to an alternate airport, or continue to the destination
airport. Many of these factors allude to the conclusion that continued flight in IMC
is not intentional but that many participants are bad at judging the weather. A
future study could conduct further quantitative and qualitative analysis to find the
set of factors that results in pilots flying VFR into IMC. If those factors could be
identified, pilot training courses could be modified to bring heightened awareness
of the hazards posed by inadvertent entry into IMC. If new training programs can
enhance pilots’ abilities to judge the weather and avoid inadvertent entry into IMC,
then a reduction in VFR into IMC-related fatalities could result. This is an
important area of research because the current study results show that despite
modern technology, pilots are still entering IMC while operating VFR.
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The third area of future research is related to the second potential area of
future research. Once the factors that contribute to pilots entering IMC while
operating under VFR are analyzed, an experimental study could be conducted
testing various interventions to increase pilots’ awareness of the weather and
examining their effectiveness at reducing VFR into IMC entries. If any
interventions are found to be effective, they could be implemented by the aviation
industry at large.
A potential fourth area of future research would be examining the
prevalence of the Dunning-Kruger effect in general aviation pilots. The DunningKruger effect could quite possibly explain several of the present study’s findings.
There are many other operational areas where pilots overstating their abilities could
potentially result in safety issues. Examples of these areas include but are not
limited to the ability to land in strong crosswinds and fly into short airstrips. If
specific areas where pilots overstate their abilities can be identified, training
courses can be modified to cover those areas.
The fifth area of future research would be developing ways to train pilots to
better judge the weather. There has already been some research looking at ways to
increase accuracy in pilots’ estimation of inflight weather, such as the study
conducted by Ahlstrom et al. (2019). However, more work needs to be performed
to develop tools to help pilots estimate the weather. This is especially important
because VFR flight into IMC is a leading killer of general aviation pilots.

Recommendations to Industry
In addition to identifying potential areas for future research, there are also a
few recommendations that can be made to the industry. The first is to make sure
student pilots truly understand the risks posed by VFR entry into IMC. This can be
done by increasing the amount of weather-related content in private pilot ground
school courses. Previous literature shows that pilots’ weather knowledge is
lacking, and multiple studies, including the current study, show that pilots struggle
to recognize degrading conditions (Blickensderfer et al. (2017); Gallo et al. (2015);
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Major et al. (2017)). A second recommendation for the industry is for EFB
manufacturers to include detailed weather and airspace restriction information as
standard features on their applications. Although the interventions did not decrease
the amount of time spent in IMC, having airspace and weather information in
graphical depictions superimposed on the moving map decreased the perceived
difficulty and increased participants’ confidence. Because flying is such a highworkload activity, any action to decrease task difficulty is advisable. A third
recommendation for the industry is to teach student pilots rules of thumb and ways
of better judging the weather. Ahlstrom et al. (2019) found that there are heuristics
that can help pilots more accurately judge the weather. These heuristics should be
universally taught in private pilot training curricula. Especially because the results
of this study indicate that pilots are still not great at judging the weather, and nearly
every pilot who entered IMC in this study expressed that they judged the weather to
be legal for VFR flight.

Conclusion
Continued VFR flight into IMC is a leading killer of general aviation pilots.
While it is not the most common type of accident, they do have one of the highest
mortality rates (AOPA, 2020). According to the AOPA Air Safety Institute, 93%
of VFR into IMC accidents are lethal. As a result of this high lethality rate, finding
ways to lower the frequency of VFR into IMC events should be a major safety
priority to those in general aviation.
A review of the literature found that while EFBs are widely used in general
and commercial aviation environments, there was little research examining the
effects that the increased amount of information EFBs provide has on pilot decision
making in the face of a VFR into IMC scenarios. The extant literature
demonstrated that while EFBs do increase task performance, pilots who utilized
moving map displays flew closer to inclement weather. This led to an experiment
that examined whether the presence of graphical airspace restrictions and weather
information would result in an increased amount of time in IMC.
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The results of the study indicated that there were no significant differences
in time in IMC or decision outcome based upon which experimental condition the
participants were assigned. There was a significant interaction between graphical
depictions of airspace restrictions and weather information on decision difficulty
and decision confidence. Additionally, these two variables were inversely
correlated with each other. Meaning that as decision confidence increased,
decision difficulty decreased. An inverse relationship was found between age and
weather judgment, meaning that younger pilots overestimated the visibility.
Finally, a thematic analysis found that of the pilots who continued, a majority
expressed that they believed the weather to be legal for VFR flight and not yet
IMC. That same thematic analysis found that a majority of the participants who
returned before entering IMC expressed that deteriorating weather was a concern.
The findings lead to the conclusion that while graphical depictions of
weather information and airspace restrictions do not increase the amount of time
pilots spend in IMC, they also do not reduce it. However, the use of the EFBs was
found to increase decision confidence and decrease perceived decision difficulty.
These findings support the conclusion that EFB use has a positive effect on pilot
performance. The findings also indicate that many pilots who enter IMC do not do
so intentionally and genuinely underestimate the weather. This finding opens up an
area of future research examining why pilots underestimate the weather and
developing interventions to estimate the weather better. Doing this may reduce the
frequency of VFR into IMC events and the accidents associated with them.
Hopefully, these results will drive future research to find ways to reduce VFR flight
into IMC accidents. Research such as this may one day result in changes to
training curricula that will render these types of accidents a thing of the past.
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Appendix A
The following items make up the demographic questionnaire:
Age:
Gender: Male/Female/Prefer Not to Say
Certificate Level (select one): Private
Commercial
Airline Transport Pilot
Instrument Rating: Yes/No
Flight Hours:
Experience with EFBs (in years):
Experience with flying in/near Washington, DC SFRA: Yes/No
If so, how much (in years):
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Appendix B
These are the anchors developed by Blais and Weber (2006) for the Domain Specific
Risk-Taking Scale (DOSPERT). The original scale consisted of a series of scenarios,
and the subjects had to rate their risk perception and likelihood to take the risk.
Directions: For each scenario, select the option that most accurately reflects your
perception of the risk the scenario possess and your likelihood to take that risk.
Scales used in DOSPERT.
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Appendix C
The following scale is the Confidence Scale as developed by Grundy (1993), used
with permission of the creator, and modified for an aviation context for the
purposes of this study. The original scale measured confidence in task
performance, while this study uses the scale to measure confidence in a decision.
Directions: Select the number which best describes how you perceive your current
ability to make the correct decision.
Items:
1.

I am certain that my decision is correct:
1

2

3

4

5

not at all
certain

certain for
only a few
steps

fairly certain
for a good
number of
steps

certain for
almost all
steps

absolutely
certain for all
steps

2.

I feel that I made the decision without hesitation:
1

2

3

4

5

I have much
hesitation

a fair
amount of
hesitation

a good part
of it without
hesitation

almost
completely
without
hesitation

absolutely no
hesitation

3.
My performance would convince an observer that I'm competent at
making the decision:
1

2

3

4

5

not at all

agree, a little

for much of
it

for almost all
of it

for
absolutely all
of it
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4.

I feel sure of myself as I made the decision:
1

2

3

4

5

not at all

very little

for much of
it

for almost all
of it

for
absolutely all
of it

5.

I feel satisfied with my decision:
1

2

3

4

5

not at all

very little

for much of
it

for almost all
of it

absolutely
satisfied with
all of it

Scoring: Add the numbers circled on each of the five statements. An individual's
score can range from 5 (low confidence) to 25 (high confidence).
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Appendix D
The following scale is the decision difficulty scale developed by Shiloh et al.
(2001). The items are rated on 7-point dimensional scales.
Directions: Read each of the items carefully. Select the number that best reflects
your response to the item.
Items:
Simple —Intricate
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

4

5

6

7

Easy — Difficult
1

2

3

Does not require deliberation — Requires much deliberation
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Entails no vacillation — Entails much vacillation
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

4

5

6

7

Plain — Elaborate
1

2

3

Scoring: The difficulty score is the average of the items.

120

Appendix E
The following scale is the risk propensity scale developed by Meertens and Lion
(2008)
Directions: Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the
following statement by putting a circle around the option you prefer. Please do not
think too long before answering; usually, your ﬁrst inclination is also the best one.
Items:
1. Safety ﬁrst.
Totally disagree — Totally agree
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

6

7

8

9

6

7

8

9

6

7

8

9

2. I do not take risks with my health.
Totally disagree — Totally agree
1

2

3

4

5

3. I prefer to avoid risks.
Totally disagree — Totally agree
1

2

3

4

5

4. I take risks regularly.
Totally disagree — Totally agree
1

2

3

4

5
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5. I really dislike not knowing what is going to happen.
Totally disagree — Totally agree
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

5

6

7

8

9

5

6

7

8

9

6. I usually view risks as a challenge.
Totally disagree — Totally agree
1

2

3

4

7. I view myself as a . . .
Risk avoider — Risk seeker
1

2

3

4

Scoring: Each item is scored on a 9-point scale. Items 1,2,3 and 4 are reverse
scored. Higher scores indicate higher risk-seeking tendencies.
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Appendix F
The following questions are the remaining questions from the post scenario survey
that were not from the validated scales.

Scenario Related Questions
During the scenario which decision did you make?
Return to Frederick (KFDK)
Divert to Martinsburg (KMRB)
Continue on to Hagerstown (Did not choose an option during video)
Did you write down some or all of the NOTAM/Weather Briefing Information to
reference during the scenario?
Yes
No
If yes, what information did you write down?
Open Ended Response
To the best of your ability, please estimate the visibility during the scenario
Open Ended Response
What factors contributed to your decision to continue, divert, or return to the
departure airport?
Open Ended Response

Additional Questions
These questions were included in the survey to ensure there were no differences on
the basis of the experimental design.
Would you respond to the scenario differently if you were flying an actual
airplane?
Yes
No
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If so, why would you respond different?
Open Ended Response
Did you play the interactive scenario in full screen view
Yes
No
During the video did you:
Skip the entire video
Skip within the video
Play the video to the end, despite making a decision
Play the video, made a decision and stop watching
What is the size of your computer monitor screen?
Smart Phone
Tablet
Small Laptop (11-14 inches)
Large Laptop (15+ inches)
Small Desktop (15 inches or less)
Large Desktop (15+ inches)
If you have any additional comments that were not addressed by the previous
questions please leave them here.
Open Ended Response
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